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OLD LYRICS, KNOCK-OFF VIDEOS, AND COPYCAT COMIC BOOKS:  THE 
FOURTH FAIR USE FACTOR IN U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
Harry Potter author J.K. Rowling resorted to a mighty muggle defense against the 
dark arts when she sued the New York Daily News for publishing excerpts from her latest 
novel three days before its official release date.1  The issues involved sit at the core of 
copyright law: creative expression, protection for unpublished works, and the effects of 
unlicensed distribution.  But while the excerpts may have been unlawful, their publication 
no doubt added to the frenzied anticipation of fans waiting to purchase the 870-page book 
once it hit the stores.
Any court opinion in this case will add to the current array of beliefs regarding 
copyright law and “fair use.”  The American legal system has long recognized that in 
certain situations, the fair use of artistic works does not infringe upon the rights of 
copyright holders.  The fair use doctrine as codified in Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright 
Act of 19762 requires a balancing of four factors: the purpose and character of the 
unlicensed use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the 
copying, and the effect of such copying on the copyright holder’s potential market.3
Courts continue to struggle with fair use, especially when confronted with a) speculative 
market predictions, and b) competing public and private interests in cases where acts of 
copying result in a net benefit to the copyright holder’s potential market,4 such as in the 
1
  Daily News Sued Over Harry Potter Scoop, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 19, 2003, at C7. 
2 See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
3
  See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
4
  For purposes of this article, there is a “net benefit” or a “benefit” to the copyright holder’s potential 
market if the copyright holder’s profits from sales of the copyrighted work are greater than they would have 
been absent the unlicensed use.  This formula does not factor in the copyright holder’s lost licensing 
revenues because often no market for such licensing exists.   However, whether any licensing market exists 
2Harry Potter case.5  The inherent difficulty in defining markets and in accurately 
assessing gains and losses, combined with a historical bias in favor of private property 
rights, has resulted in judicial uncertainty, inconsistency, and inaccuracy in applications 
of the fourth fair use factor to situations where the copyright holder benefits.6
Despite judicial skepticism, unauthorized uses of copyrighted works have 
benefited rather than destroyed several major industries.  Among the most notable 
examples are the Japanese manga (comic book) market, segments of the music industry, 
and television broadcasting.   What follows is a discussion of each of these examples.
and, if so, the extent of such a market, is a critical variable in analyzing the copyright holder’s potential 
market, one which I will isolate and examine independently from the question of market benefit.  
5
  Courts have considered possible market benefit from an unlicensed use in the following cases:  Campbell 
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 n.21 (1994); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454-55 (1984); Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 392 (4th Cir. 2003); Suntrust Bank v. 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1274-1275 (11th Cir. 2001); Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 
235 F.3d 18, 25 (1st Cir. 2000); Castle Rock Ent., Inc. v. Carol Publg. Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 144-46 
(2d Cir. 1998); Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 1998); Sundeman v. Seajay
Socy., 142 F.3d 194, 206-07 (4th Cir. 1998); Ringgold v. Black Ent., 126 F.3d 70, 80-81 (2d Cir. 1997); 
Allen v. Academic Games League of Am., Inc., 89 F.3d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1996); Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. 
v. Publications Int’l , Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1377 (2d Cir. 1993); Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 
731, 739 (2d Cir. 1991); Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1263-1264 (2d Cir. 1986); DC 
Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982); Iowa St. U. Research Found., Inc. v. 
Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 621 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1980); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Ent., Inc., 
192 F. Supp. 2d 321, 342-43 (D.N.J. 2002); Video-Cinema Films, Inc. v. Cable News Network, Inc., 2001 
WL 1518264, *8 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Hofheinz v. AMC Prod., Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 127, 140-141 (E.D.N.Y. 
2001); A & M Rec., Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 914-15 (N.D. Cal. 2000); UMG Recordings, 
Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of Month 
Club, 13 F. Supp. 2d 782, 789-90 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Higgins v. Detroit Educ. Television Found., 4 F. Supp. 
2d 701, 708-710 (E.D. Mich. 1998); Jackson v. Warner Bros. Inc., 993 F. Supp. 585, 591-592 (E.D. Mich. 
1997); Educ. Testing Serv. v. Stanley H. Kaplan, Educ. Ctr., Ltd., 965 F. Supp. 731, 736 (D. Md. 1997); 
L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l , Ltd., 942 F. Supp. 1265, 1273-1274 (C.D. Cal. 1996); 
Amsinck v. Colum. Pictures Indus., 862 F. Supp. 1044, 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Adv. Computer Serv. of 
Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 366 (E.D. Va. 1994); Rubin v. Brooks/Cole Publg. Co., 
836 F. Supp. 909, 921-22 (D. Mass. 1993); Lish v. Harper’s Mag. Found., 807 F. Supp. 1090, 1104 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); Wojnarowicz v. Am. Fam. Assn., 745 F. Supp. 130, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Telerate Sys., 
Inc. v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221, 229-230 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Weissmann v. Freeman, 684 F. Supp. 1248, 1262 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); Update Art, Inc. v. Maariv Israel Newsp., Inc., 635 F. Supp. 228, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); 
Haberman v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 626 F. Supp. 201, 212-214 (D. Mass. 1986); Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Moral 
Majority, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 1526, 1539-1540 (C.D. Cal. 1985); Horn Abbot Ltd. v. Sarsaparilla Ltd., 601 
F. Supp. 360, 367-68 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atl. Co-op., Inc., 479 F. 
Supp. 351, 360 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Harms v. Cohen, 279 F. 276, 279 (D. Pa. 1922).
6 See generally id.
3Three Examples 
Japanese Comic Books
Manga—an expressive medium similar to what Americans call comic books or 
graphic novels7—account for nearly one-third of the revenue earned by the entire 
Japanese publishing industry.8  The mammoth interest in manga has spawned a 
subsidiary industry known as dojinshi, which consist of manga stories featuring well-
known, copyrighted manga characters written about and drawn for the most part by 
unauthorized authors and artists.9 Dojinshi—which are sold on the Internet, at 
conventions that attract tens of thousands of enthusiastic fans,10 and at a small number of 
major bookstores11—have not been a consistent target of copyright litigation in Japan.12
Instead, manga authors and publishers have tolerated (and in some cases encouraged) the 
proliferation of dojinshi, with several manga publishers regularly advertising their 
7 See generally Salil Mehra, Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain Why All the Cartoons My 
Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 155 (2002).
8 Id. at 157 (citing Nicole Gaouette, Get Your Manga Here: An Ancient Japanese Art Form – Book-Length 
Comic Strips – Is Catching on in the U.S., CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 8, 1999, at 13).
9 Id. at 156.  Dojinshi are similar to the fan fiction commonly found on the Internet.  See Michelle Pauli, 
Fan Fiction, THE GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 5, 2002, at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/online/story/0,3605,853539,00.html (“In this curious literary genre that is 
flourishing on the net, fans of a particular book, TV series or film write their own stories using established 
characters and settings. Click on to http://fanfiction.net, the largest repository of fan fiction on the web, and 
you will find nearly 50,000 original stories written by Harry Potter addicts using Rowling’s characters.”); 
David Plotz, Luke Skywalker is Gay?: Fan Fiction is America’s Literature of Obsession, SLATE, Apr. 14, 
2000, at http://slate.msn.com/id/80225/ (“In ‘fanfic,’ as practitioners call it, devotees of a TV show, movie, 
or (less often) book write stories about its characters. They chronicle the alternative adventures of Xena, 
warrior princess; open the X-Files that Mulder and Scully don’t dare touch; and fill in the back story to Star 
Wars Episode I.”); Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17 
LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 651 (1997); Deborah Tussey, From Fan Sites to Filesharing: Personal Use in 
Cyberspace, 35 GA. L. REV. 1129 (2001); Jessica Elliott, Copyright Fair Use and Private Ordering: Are 
Copyright Holders and the Copyright Law Fanatical For Fansites?, 11 J. ART & ENT. L. 329 (2001); 
Meredith McCardle, Note, Fan Fiction, Fandom, and Fanfare: What’s All the Fuss?, 9 B.U. J. SCI. &
TECH. L. 433 (2003). 
10
  Mehra, supra note 7, at 156-57, 164-65; Lawrence Lessig, Copy Cats and Robotic Dogs: What Lawyers 
Can Learn from Comic Books, RED HERRING, Jan. 10, 2003, at
http://www.herring.com/mag/issue121/5636.html (“Dojinshi conventions are among Japan’s largest mass 
gatherings, drawing more than 450,000 fans and 33,000 artists each year.”).   
11
  Mehra, supra note 7, at 158 (citing Sharon Kinsella, Japanese Subculture in the 1990s: Otaku and the 
Amateur Manga Movement, 24 J. JAP. STUD. 289, 295 (1998)).
4products at dojinshi conventions.13  The non-creative sections of the publishing industry 
(printers and binders) produce dojinshi14 and have therefore definitely prospered from 
dojinshi sales.15  But the mainstream manga products also benefit because dojinshi help
promote the original comic book characters.16  The phenomenon is a prime example of 
how widespread copying can augment the market for copyrighted works. 
Digital Musical Sampling
Adapting the work of one artist (usually from an earlier era) to create something 
new has become a common practice in the music industry, especially among rap artists.17
In a process known as “digital sampling,” excerpts from previously recorded works are 
incorporated verbatim into new songs, including the voices of the original singers.18  The 
practice expanded in the 1980s with the invention and increasing affordability of Musical 
12 Mehra, supra note 7, at 184.
13 Id.
14
  Eric Prideaux, By the People, For the People, THE JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 23, 2003, available at 
http://www.japantimes.com/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?fl20030323a2.htm (“And though their creators are 
mainly amateurs, the paper and printing quality of many dojinshi rivals or exceeds that of the thick, gaudy 
manga on pulp paper that weigh down konbini shelves from Hokkaido to Okinawa.”); Mary Kennard, 
Amateur Manga Flourishing, THE DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), Jan. 26, 2002, at 11 (“Production quality is 
extremely high. Dojinshi are usually offset-printed, with professional-level binding and high-grade paper. 
Print runs vary widely.  Popular groups, or circles, might print as many as 5,000 of one dojinshi, while less-
known circles might only print 100 copies.”).
15
  Kennard, supra note 14 (“Dojinshi support a significant financial sector, from art supplies to printing 
companies to delivery services. There are about 100 small printing companies that specialize in printing 
just these books.”).
16 See Mehra, supra note 7, at 184, 191.  
17 See Stephen R. Wilson, Music Sampling Lawsuits: Does Looping Music Samples Defeat the De Minimis 
Defense?, 1 J. HIGH TECH. L. 179, 182 (2002); Henry Self, Comment, Digital Sampling: A Cultural 
Perspective, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 347, 350-51 (2002); Margaret E. Watson, Unauthorized Digital 
Sampling in Musical Parody: A Haven in the Fair Use Doctrine?, 21 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 469, 474-75 
(1999); Matthew G. Passmore, Note, A Brief Return to the Digital Sampling Debate, 20 HASTINGS COMM. 
& ENT. L.J. 833, 838-39 (1998) (“Since the 1980’s, rap music has relied heavily on the use of digital 
samples.”); Sherri Carl Hampel, Note, Are Samplers Getting a Bum Rap?: Copyright Infringement or 
Technological Creativity?, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 559, 560 (“Part of the innovation in rap music is the use of 
digital samples.”); Jason H. Marcus, Note, Don’t Stop That Funky Beat: The Essentiality of Digital 
Sampling to Rap Music, 13 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 767, 770-72 (1991).
18 See Wilson, supra note 17, at 179 (citing Donald S. Passman, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE 
MUSIC BUSINESS 306 (2000)).
5Instrument Digital Interface (MIDI) synthesizers.19  Many current performers argue that 
sampling benefits original artists by encouraging the purchase of the primary source.20
Unauthorized sampling was at the center of a 1994 U.S. Supreme Court case, 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.21 The rap group 2 Live Crew used portions of an 
original work in a parody of Roy Orbison’s well-known hit “Pretty Woman.”22  In 
recognizing the song as a parody, the Court acknowledged that 2 Live Crew had 
transformed the original source in a creative fashion23 and therefore that the appropriation 
possibly qualified as an instance of fair use.24 However, while the Court reversed an 
appellate court’s finding that the newer song’s commercial purpose made the use 
“presumptively unfair,”25 it also warned the lower court against finding summary 
judgment in favor of 2 Live Crew because of inconclusive evidence regarding the 
appropriation’s negative effect on the copyright holder’s derivative markets.26 As to 
possible market benefit, the Court stated, “Judge Leval gives the example of the film 
producer’s appropriation of a composer’s previously unknown song that turns the song 
into a commercial success; the boon to the song does not make the film’s simple copying 
19 See David Sanjek,“Don’t Have to DJ No More”: Sampling and the “Autonomous” Creator, 10 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L.J. 607, 612 (1992).
20
  See, e.g., Passmore, supra note 17, at 839 (“Many record labels view mix tapes [composed of samples of 
previous recordings] as ‘a form of promotion and marketing for the [original] artist[s],’ and thus tacitly 
sanction the distribution of mix tapes that feature the label’s artists.”) (quoting Anita M. Samuels, New 
Urban Art Form, Old Copyright Problem: A Music Industry at Odds on ‘Mix Tapes,’ N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 
1996, at C8).
21 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
22 Id. at 571.
23
  The concept of transformative use is discussed in Part II-B and Part IV-B, infra.
24 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579-83.  Furthermore, the Court restated an intolerance of unauthorized sampling 
that simply duplicates the original work rather than transforming it.  Id. at 591-92 (“[W]hen a commercial 
use amounts to mere duplication of the entirety of an original, it clearly ‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the 
original and serves as a market replacement for it, making it likely that cognizable market harm to the 
original will occur. But when, on the contrary, the second use is transformative, market substitution is at 
least less certain, and market harm may not be so readily inferred.”) (citing Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair 
Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1125 (1990) [hereinafter Leval, Fair Use Standard]).
25 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590-94.
26
  Id. at 593-94.
6fair.”27 Along with other courts, the U.S. Supreme Court failed to adequately consider 
the potential benefits of sampling on the market for the copyrighted work.
Television Broadcasting and Video Recorders
Television broadcasters share something in common with music companies in that 
technological innovations have opened the door for the widespread unauthorized copying 
of original works.  But television differs from music and comic books in terms of how 
revenue is collected—that is, broadcasters sell advertising whereas the bulk of music and 
comic book profits comes from selling tangible products.  Thus, the recording of 
television programs does not harm individual creators and artists (who are at the center of 
copyright law protections) but rather expands the potential viewing audience for both a 
program and the advertisements aired during it.28  Recognizing this benefit in Sony Corp. 
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the U. S. Supreme Court described the delayed 
watching of videotaped television shows as a “time shifting” activity protected under the 
fair use doctrine.29  This serves as an example of how electronic or digital copying 
enhances the market for copyrighted works.
***
The three examples above are significantly different in terms of their legal and 
economic implications.  The Japanese manga and dojinshi markets co-exist because the 
latter benefits the former and because there is less incentive to litigate under Japanese 
27 Id. at 591 n.21 (citing Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 24, at 1124 n.84 (1990)).
28
  Recent recording technology which allows users to skip commercials would require a different analysis.  
See Matthew W. Bower, Note, Replaying the Betamax Case for the New Digital VCRs: Introducing TiVo to 
Fair Use, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 417 (2002); Chris Sprigman, Are Personal Video Recorders Such 
as ReplayTV and TiVo Copyright-Infringement Devices?, May 9, 2002, at 
http://writ.findlaw.com/commentary/20020509_sprigman.html (discussing Paramount Pictures v. 
SonicBlue, where the plaintiffs claimed that commercial skipping technology contributed to the 
infringement of their copyrights).
29
  464 U.S. 417, 421 (1984).
7copyright law than under its American counterpart.30  However, the opinions in cases 
such as Sony and Campbell reflect the inconsistency among lower courts as to how much 
weight to afford net market benefit from an unlicensed use.31  In Sony, the Court 
emphasized the ways that electronic or digital copying enhance the market for 
copyrighted material,32 while in Campbell it expressed skepticism over the supposed 
benefit of electronic manipulation—an increase in the market for a dated product.33  Such 
irregular applications of the fair use doctrine reveal judges’ differing conceptualizations 
of fair use and copyright law.
Legal and economic theorists who discuss fair use in terms of transaction costs34
suggest that users should pay fair market value to copyright holders to license their works 
and that narrowly defined parameters for fair use best protect the incentives of artists and 
authors to create.35  According to their incentive-based models, these scholars argue that 
in an environment of low or non-existent transaction costs, judicial intervention on behalf 
30
  Mehra, supra note 7, at 185-86.  According to Professor Mehra, there is less incentive to litigate under 
Japanese copyright law because of the design of the Japanese legal system.  It inhibits litigation as a result 
of few lawyers and long delays.  See id.
31 See generally supra note 5.
32 Sony, 464 U.S. at 447-55.
33 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591-94.
34 See generally Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the 
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982); William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. OF LEG. STUD. 325 (1989); Michael G. Anderson & 
Paul F. Brown, The Economics Behind Copyright Fair Use: A Principled and Predictable Body of Law, 24 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 143 (1993); Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights 
Management on Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557 (1998); Tom W. Bell, Escape from 
Copyright: Market Success v. Statutory Failure in the Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REV.
741, 758 (2001) [hereinafter Bell, Escape] (“Courts and commentators agree that copyright law represents 
a statutory response to market failure.”) (citing United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 
158 (1948)); Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright Law 
in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215 (1996); David McGowan, Free Contracting, Fair 
Competition, and Article 2B: Some Reflections on Federal Competition Policy, Information Transactions, 
and "Aggressive Neutrality," 13 BERKELY TECH. L.J. 1173 (1998); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for 
Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 
(1970).
35 See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 34; Breyer, supra note 34; William M. Landes, Copyright, 
Borrowed Images, and Appropriation Art: An Economic Approach, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 5 (2000) 
8of unlicensed users decreases or eliminates incentives for innovation.36  Thus, they 
believe that application of fair use is only appropriate where there are high transaction 
costs or other barriers to licensing copyrighted works.37  These theorists think that fair 
use should be regarded as a defense and not a limitation on a copyright holder’s exclusive 
rights,38 primarily because they fail to properly recognize extrinsic social and other non-
economic benefits from the unlicensed use of copyrighted works.39
Critics of this analysis rightfully note that an incentive-based model offers little 
guidance for those courts wanting to draw a clear line between fair and unfair use, one 
that maximizes the incentive to create without giving artists extraneous benefits.40
Infringement claims asserted in cases where the unlicensed use increases the copyright 
holder’s potential market—such as sampling and taping television shows—draw 
additional skepticism to this model.  Economic theorists believe copyright law should 
preserve the right of copyright holders to choose between profiting from licensing their 
works and relying on uncertain economic benefits from an enhanced market.41  But to 
preserve that choice, the copyright holder who litigates successfully should not receive 
statutory or other compensatory damages42 as well as the benefits of an enhanced market.  




  See id.
38 See Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright 
Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 49 (1997).
39 See id.
40 See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. 
REV. 483 (1996).
41
  See, e.g., Maureen A. O’Rourke, Evaluating Mistakes in Intellectual Property Law: Configuring the 
System for Imperfection, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 167, 171-72 (2000).
42
  “The Copyright Act permits a prevailing copyright owner in an infringement action to obtain both 
monetary and nonmonetary relief.  The available nonmonetary relief includes injunctive relief and 
affirmative equitable relief, while the monetary remedies include statutory damages, compensatory 
damages, infringers’ profits, and costs and attorneys’ fees.” Dane S. Ciolino, Reconsidering Restitution in 
Copyright, 48 EMORY L.J. 1, 9 (1999).
9Rather, the copyright holder who is successful in litigation should forgo the benefit of an 
enhanced market by having that benefit offset monetary damages. 
Perhaps a better explanation would be that in most cases in which copying results 
in a net increase to the copyright holder’s market, market failure is not the result of high 
transaction costs but of the copyright holder not wanting to enter into a licensing 
relationship with the user in the first place.  In these cases, market failure occurs when the 
copyright holder takes offense unrelated to economic harm.  In the absence of fair use, 
injunctive relief,43 rather than monetary damages, may be more appropriate. However, 
this type of market failure is more likely to occur when an unauthorized user transforms a 
copyrighted work, which often leads to a finding of fair use and moots the question of the 
appropriate remedy.
Many critics of the economic model conceptualize fair use not as a defense but as 
a limit on the exclusive rights of the copyright holder in cases in which the unlicensed use 
Damages for copyright infringement are provided for in Section 504 of the Copyright Act.  17 
U.S.C. § 504(a) (2003) (“[A]n infringer is liable for either 1) the copyright owner’s actual damages and any 
additional profits of the infringer … ; or 2) statutory damages, as provided by subsection (c).”).  
Accordingly, a copyright owner successful in litigation must decide between actual and statutory damages.  
To determine the amount of actual damages, a court considers profits that the copyright owner lost because 
of the infringement (competitive sales), as well as any additional profits earned by the infringer as a result 
of the unlicensed use of the copyrighted work (noncompetitive sales).  See generally 1 JOHN GLADSTONE 
MILLS, III ET AL., PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 6:90 (2d ed. 2002).   
Alternatively, a copyright owner can seek statutory damages. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a).  Courts have 
broad discretion in calculating statutory damages.  According to § 504(c), statutory damages can range 
from $750 to $30,000 per “occurrence” of infringement, but can reach as much as $150,000 if the court 
finds that the infringement was “willful.”  17 U.S.C. § 504(c).  Statutory damages are most relevant to the 
analysis in this article because in cases of market benefit, the copyright holder does not have any lost 
profits (apart from potential lost licensing revenues).   Also possibly relevant are monetary awards that, in 
effect, disgorge the infringer of its non-competitive profits from the unlicensed use.   I take up this measure 
of damages briefly in Part V-B, infra.
43
  See Ciolino, supra note 42, at 9-11 (“Courts generally grant preliminary injunctive relief in copyright 
cases when the owner proves the reasonable likelihood that he will succeed on the merits. While proof of 
irreparable harm is a prerequisite to the granting of preliminary equitable relief in most federal cases, courts 
in copyright cases typically presume the existence of irreparable harm. … Likewise, courts readily enter 
permanent injunctions upon proof of ‘past infringement and a substantial likelihood of future 
infringement.’”) (citing, inter alia, Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 
10
is transformative.44  They perceive fair use as an example of market failure because the 
market does not support transformative uses that add social, non-monetary value to the 
copyrighted work.45 This approach has its own flaws: not every transformative use is a 
fair use, and some non-transformative uses, including several that serve such public goals 
as education and public adjudication, are fair in certain cases.  Both courts and scholars 
have found it difficult to balance the economic interests of copyright holders with the 
benefits to the public domain of a transformative or public46 use.47
When there exists a potential net increase to the copyright holder’s market with
no evidence of market harm, courts should (and, for the most part, do) recognize 
transformative and public uses as fair, as such findings successfully balance a copyright 
holder’s economic rights with the public interest.48  But if the use is non-transformative 
and private, then the increase to the copyright holder’s market should, at a minimum, 
offset damages even if the use is deemed unfair.  In this article, I will analyze cases in 
which an unlicensed use enhances a copyright holder’s market.  More often than not, 
(2d Cir. 1977); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int’l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1984); Atari, Inc. 
v. North Am. Phillips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 613 (7th Cir. 1982)).
44
  See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Fair Use Rescued, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1449 (1997) [hereinafter Leval, 
Rescued]; infra note 89 (defining “transformative”).
45 See generally Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975 
(2002) [hereinafter Lunney, Jr., Market Failure]; Bell, Escape, supra note 34; Loren, supra note 38; Mark 
A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997); 
Wendy J. Gordon, The “Market Failure” and Intellectual Property: A Response to Professor Lunney, 82 
B.U. L. REV. 1031 (2002); Michael A. Einhorn, Miss Scarlett’s License Done Gone!: Parody, Satire, and 
Markets, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 589 (2002); Matthew D. Bunker, Eroding Fair Use: The 
“Transformative” Use Doctrine After Campbell, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1 (2002).
46
  As explained in Part IV-B, infra, a public use, whether commercial or not, is a use that furthers some 
governmental purpose such as education.
47 See generally supra notes 5, 34, and 45.
48 See, e.g., Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2003); Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 
18, 25 (1st Cir. 2000); Allen v. Academic Games League of Am., Inc., 89 F.3d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1996);
Hofheinz v. AMC Prod., Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 127, 140-141 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
11
applying the fair use doctrine in these cases calls into question the accepted notion of 
copyrights as property.49
In Part II, I will look at the origins of the fair use doctrine, explain the four 
statutory factors that courts use to analyze fair use, and examine how the U.S. Supreme 
Court has addressed unlicensed uses that possibly enhance the copyright holder’s 
potential market.  In Part III, I will discuss how fair use is conceptualized under the 
predominant theories of intellectual property and how any use that increases a copyright 
holder’s market may be classified under those theories.  Part IV consists of an analysis 
and categorization of all fair use cases in which individual courts have recognized 
potential net increases to a copyright holder’s market, as well as a framework for a 
public/private dichotomy in place of the commercial/non-commercial dichotomy 
prevalent in fair use jurisprudence.  In Part V, I reject economic market failure as an 
explanation for many fair use claims.   I then describe a doctrinal framework for 
resolving fair use claims in cases in which an unlicensed use increases a copyright 
holder’s market and reconcile that framework with the predominant intellectual property 
theories.  In Part VI, I will offer suggestions for developing a paradigm to look more 
generally at fair use, copyright law, and intellectual property rights.
49
  See generally Douglas Y’Barbo, The Heart of the Matter: The Property Right Conferred by Copyright, 
49 MERCER L. REV. 643 (1998); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 
(1988) [hereinafter Hughes, Philosophy] (“In the centuries since our founding, the concept of property has 
changed dramatically in the United States. … A less frequently discussed trend is that historically 
recognized but nonetheless atypical forms of property, such as intellectual property, are becoming 
increasingly important relative to the old paradigms of property, such as farms, factories, and 
furnishings.”); Tussey, supra note 9, at 1170 (“Labor-desert, based on John Locke’s writings concerning 
real property, assumes the natural property right of the creator of an intellectual property work.”).
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II.  FAIR USE AND THE FOURTH FACTOR
Combining a look at the history of the fair use doctrine, the four factors delineated 
by Congress, and the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of fair use lays an appropriate 
foundation for reconsidering modern-day applications of the doctrine.  To develop a new 
fair use framework requires a clear understanding of the doctrine and its purpose.
A. The History of the Fair Use Doctrine 
Central to U.S. copyright law,50 the fair use doctrine51 balances the private rights 
of copyright holders with the public’s interest in accessing and using copyrighted works.
As interpreted by the courts, the main purpose of U.S. copyright law is to give artists 
sufficient protection for original creations so as to provide them adequate incentives for 
creating new works, while giving the public the right to use existing works under 
specifically defined conditions.52
The fair use principle53 can be traced to eighteenth-century England, a time during 
which English courts54 tried to establish a delicate balance between promoting the arts 
and sciences as part of the public domain and protecting property rights of artists and 
50
  See, e.g., Anderson & Brown, supra note 34, at 153 (Fair use is a “necessary part of copyright law, the 
observance of which is essential to achieve the goals of that law.”).
51
  The term “fair use” was coined in Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136) 
(addressing the question of “whether there has been a legitimate use, in the fair exercise of a mental 
operation, deserving the character of an original work, or whether matter has been taken colorably, animo 
furandi”).
52 See, e.g., Blaine C. Kimrey, Amateur Guitar Player’s Lament II: A Critique of A&M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc., and a Clarion Call For Copyright Harmony in Cyberspace, 20 REV. LITIG. 309, 319 (2001) 
(“Copyright serves two countervailing purposes.  The first purpose is to help authors protect their works so 
they will have an incentive to produce.  The second purpose is to facilitate public access to those works.”) 
(citations omitted).
53
  “Fair use” was known as “fair abridgment” in the early English cases.  See Loren, supra note 38, at 13-
14.
54
  The early English cases included the following: Gyles v. Wilcox, 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (Ch. 1740); Dodsley 
v. Kinnersley, 27 Eng. Rep. 270 (Ch. 1761); Cary v. Kearsley, 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 4 Esp. 168 (K.B. 1802); 
Roworth v. Wilkes, 170 Eng. Rep. 889 (K.B. 1807).
13
inventors.55  But as courts were primarily concerned with protecting private property 
rights, they generally ruled that an unauthorized use was unfair if it harmed the market 
for the original work by competing against it.56  In seeking to prevent unwanted market 
competition, the courts were only somewhat mindful of the public benefit of certain
unlicensed uses and allowed copying to proceed under narrowly-prescribed 
circumstances if they found that the use added to the public domain.57
The first American appropriation of the fair use doctrine occurred in the 1841 
case of Folsom v. Marsh.58  The defendant, who had written a biography of George 
Washington, was sued for using excerpts of letters from the plaintiff’s copyrighted and 
published biography of the first president.  In finding for the plaintiff, the Massachusetts 
federal district court considered the factors59 that were later accepted universally as part 
of the modern fair use doctrine.60  In Folsom, Justice Story listed those factors as the 
“nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, 
and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or 
supercede the objects, of the original work.”61
55 See Loren, supra note 38, at 13-15 (citing William F. Patry, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT 
LAW 3, 6-18, 171 (2d ed. 1995)).
56 See, e.g., Roworth, 170 Eng. Rep. at 890 (When “so much is extracted that it communicates the same 
knowledge [as] the original work, it is an actionable violation of literary property.”).
57
  See Loren, supra note 38, at 13-15. See also Cary, 4 Esp. at 170.  In Cary, the court remarked to the 
jury that “a man may fairly adopt part of the work of another: he may so make use of another’s labours for 
the promotion of science, and the benefit of the public: but having done so, the question will be, was the 
matter so taken used fairly with that view, and without what I may term the animus [or the intention to 
steal].” Id.
58
  9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
59
  The “nature and objects of the selections made” split into the first two factors of the modern fair use 
doctrine. 
60
  The four factors comprising the fair use doctrine are “(1) The purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the 
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work 
as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”  
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2003).
61 Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348.  
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It took Congress 130 years following the Folsom decision to incorporate the fair 
use doctrine into statutory law62 when it established limitations on a copyright holder’s 
exclusive rights63 in Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976.  According to its 
legislative history, the Act was created to “restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, 
not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way.”64  Based on a constitutional mandate,65
Congress first passed copyright legislation in 1790 to protect artists, “mainly with a view 
to inducing them to give their ideas to the public, so that they may be added to the 
intellectual store, accessible to people, and that they may be used for the intellectual 
advancement of mankind.”66  These objectives were identical to those established by 
English courts in the preceding century but have been questioned by scholars in recent 
years.67
62
  See Loren, supra note 38, at 19 (explaining that around 1955, Congress debated whether fair use needed 
to be codified as it had existed for over a century as a judicially created and enforced doctrine.  Of the 
experts Congress consulted, eight of the nine believed that fair use could remain a judicial doctrine; 
however, as history makes clear, Congress ultimately went forward with codification of the doctrine.) 
(citing Alan Latman, SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, 86TH CONG., 2D 
SESS., STUDY NO. 14 ON FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 39-44 (Comm. Print 1960)).
63
  The six exclusive rights guaranteed to copyright owners in the Copyright Act of 1976 were:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or 
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and 
motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion 
picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and 
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means 
of a digital audio transmission. 
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976).
64 H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976).
65
  The constitutional mandate was “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
66
  Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
67 See, e.g., Loren, supra note 38, at 47-48, 56 (“Courts should instead focus on what rule would best serve 
the public interest.  Courts should ask if the overall public is better served by permitting the kind of use at 
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Since 1976, various courts have offered barometers for determining the fairness of 
unlicensed uses.68 However, judges continue to struggle because of the uncertainty of 
fact-specific inquiries that are required in copyright infringement cases69 and because 
there does not appear to be any universal understanding of how the four factors play out 
in different types of cases.70   Neither Congress nor the courts have created strict rules for 
applying the doctrine in various situations.  As a result, courts have applied fair use 
inconsistently,71 which has increased the confusion over the doctrine.  
Most courts have interpreted fair use as an affirmative defense to copyright 
infringement rather than as a limitation on the scope of a copyright holder’s rights.72
issue without the obligation to pay the copyright owner.”); Lunney, Jr., Market Failure, supra note 45, at 
996 (“The primary purpose of copyright is neither to protect the natural or moral rights of authors nor to 
reward copyright owners. Rather, copyright’s primary purpose is to ensure the public an adequate supply of 
copyrighted works.”); Naomi Abe Voegtli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1213, 
1217 (1997) (“[T]he ultimate goal of copyright law … is to ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts.’”); Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers, and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use Doctrine for Cyberspace, 53 
FLA. L. REV. 107 (2001); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyright in Cyberspace: Don’t Throw Out the 
Public Interest with the Bath Water, 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 403.
68 See, e.g., supra note 5.
69 See, e.g., American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Fair use is a 
doctrine the application of which always depends on consideration of the precise facts at hand.”) (citing 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1170 (1994); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985); Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 739 (2d Cir. 1991); 
H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-66 (1976) (“[N]o generally applicable definition [of fair use] 
is possible, and each case raising the question must be decided on its own facts.”); Mura v. Columbia 
Broadcasting System, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 587, 590 (D.C.N.Y.1965)).  
70 See, e.g., William W. Fisher, III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1661, 1692-
94 (1988) [hereinafter Fisher, Fair Use]; Stephen M. McJohn, Fair Use and Privatization in Copyright, 35 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 62 (1998) (“Although attempts have been made, the fair use doctrine has not been 
reduced to a single form susceptible of straightforward application.  Authorities regularly call fair use so 
malleable as to be indeterminate.”); Jay Dratler, Distilling the Witches’ Brew of Fair Use in Copyright Law, 
43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 233 (1988); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 
103 HARV. L. REV. 1137 (1990); William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, 
Presumptions, and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667 (1992).
71 See id.
72
  The question is whether the fair use doctrine benefits the defendant by providing the defendant with a 
larger shield, or does it instead provide the plaintiff with a smaller sword?  Fair use is usually described as a 
defense to copyright infringement—a “privilege” to use a copyrighted work in a reasonable manner without 
the copyright owner’s consent—but sometimes is described as a “limitation” upon the rights of copyright 
owners.  Compare Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966) (fair 
use is a “privilege”); Toksvig v. Bruce Pub. Co., 181 F.2d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 1950) (same); with Sony Corp. 
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 461-62 (1984) (“Section 106 of the 1976 Act grants 
the owner of a copyright a variety of exclusive rights in the copyrighted work … This grant expressly is 
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According to Lydia Loren, courts “have not fully embraced the importance of fair use as
a counterbalance to the limited monopoly rights granted to copyright owners.”73  Loren’s 
interpretation seems most consistent with the balance that courts need to strike between 
public and private rights.74  What is for certain, however, is that amid the confusion in 
interpreting and applying the four fair use factors lies ambiguity regarding the purpose of 
the doctrine.
B. The Four Factors
The four fair use factors75 that Congress included in the Copyright Act of 1976 
are: “(1) The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
made subject to 107-118, which create a number of exemptions and limitations on the copyright owner’s 
rights.”). However, these two conflicting views are often confused.  See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976) (“The judicial doctrine of fair use, one of the most important and well-
established limitations on the exclusive right of copyright owners, would be given express statutory 
recognition for the first time in section 107. The claim that a defendant’s acts constituted a fair use rather 
than an infringement has been raised as a defense in innumerable copyright actions over the years, and 
there is ample case law recognizing the existence of the doctrine and applying it.”). 
73 Loren, supra note 38, at 5.  Professor Loren explains, “[I]t is in some ways a unique idea that the public 
has the right to make certain kinds of uses of another’s property.  These permitted uses, however, are an 
important part of what allows copyright to promote knowledge and learning in the United States.”  Id.
(citing L. Ray Patterson & Stanley W. Lindberg, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS 
109-122 (1991); Richard Stallman, Reevaluating Copyright: The Public Must Prevail, 75 OR. L. REV. 291, 
293 (1996); L. Ray Patterson, Copyright and the “Exclusive Right” of Authors, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 37
(1993); United States v. Dowling, 473 U.S. 207, 216 (1985)).
74
  This is the author’s view of the fair use defense.  There is disagreement as to whether fair use offers 
limited exceptions to a copyright holder’s exclusive rights or whether it sets a boundary between where the 
copyright holder’s rights end and where the public’s rights begin. Compare John Carlin, Culture Vultures: 
Artistic Appropriation and Intellectual Property Law, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 103, 135 (1988) (fair 
use “is an existing doctrine which the courts can employ to discriminate between purely commercial 
exploitation and the need for art to develop and create on its own terms, not those dictated by copyright 
law”); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 7 (1987) 
(characterizing copyright as “an encroachment on the public domain, justified only if it provides the public 
with some form of compensation”); Loren, supra note 38, at 3-4 (“Copyright law in this country is often 
spoken of as a balance between the rights granted to copyright owners and the rights guaranteed to the 
users of copyrighted materials”); with William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images, and 
Appropriation Art: An Economic Approach, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 10 (2000) (“Fair use limits the 
rights of the copyright holder by allowing unauthorized copying in circumstances that are roughly 
consistent with promoting economic efficiency.”).
75
  Congress did not intend for the four factors to be exclusive.  See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (“The factors enumerated in [Section 107] are not meant to be 
exclusive.”); H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976) (“[T]he courts have evolved a set of 
criteria which, though in no case definitive or determinative, provide some gauge for balancing the 
equities.”); Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 70, at 687 (“Fair use is a weighing process involving 
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commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the 
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for 
or value of the copyrighted work.”76  Courts have generally interpreted the law as 
requiring a balancing of all four factors.77
According to the Section 107 preamble, legitimate fair use purposes are 
“criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom 
use), scholarship, or research.”78  However, uses for these specific purposes are neither
exempt from the four factor analysis,79 nor are all other instances excluded.80
Consequently, fair use analysis is viewed as a difficult,81 fact-intensive,82 and 
discretionary process requiring case-by- case examination.83
nonexclusive and multifaceted factors.”); Lemley, supra note 45, at 1024 n.171 (“Section 107 provides a 
list of four nonexclusive factors to consider in determining whether a particular use is fair.”); Tussey, supra
note 9, at 1144 n.40 (“The court may have added a transformative or productive use requirement to the 
usual four factors, though the precise scope of that requirement is unclear.”) (citing Laura G. Lape, Fair 
Use: The Productive Use Factor in Fair Use Doctrine, 58 ALB. L. REV. 677 (1995)).
76 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2003).
77 See, e.g, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994) (“Nor may the four statutory 
factors be treated in isolation, one from another. All are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in 
light of the purposes of copyright.”).
78
  17 U.S.C. § 107 (2003).
79
  As the House Report explains,
For example, the reference to fair use “by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by 
any other means” is mainly intended to make clear that the doctrine has as much 
application to photocopying and taping as to older forms of use; it is not intended to give 
these kinds of reproduction any special status under the fair use provision or to sanction 
any reproduction beyond the normal and reasonable limits of fair use.  Similarly, the 
newly-added reference to “multiple copies for classroom use” is a recognition that, under 
the proper circumstances of fairness, the doctrine can be applied to reproductions of 
multiple copies for the members of a class.
H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1976).
80 See id. (“The examples enumerated … while by no means exhaustive, give some idea of the sort of 
activities the courts might regard as fair use under the circumstances.”).
81
  Judge Learned Hand once described the fair use doctrine as “the most troublesome in the whole law of 
copyright.” Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
82 See, e.g., Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
1177, 1191 (2002) (“The inquiry is heavily fact-intensive, with no one factor determinative.”); Matthew 
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1. First Factor: “Purpose and Character of Use”
Courts have focused on three dichotomies in applying the first fair use factor.  
The first is the distinction between non-licensed uses for commercial purposes versus 
those for non-commercial purposes.84  Congress did not intend for courts to use this 
factor to restrict the fair use doctrine to educational or non-profit uses but rather wanted 
to ensure that commercial motivation was considered in judicial analyses.85   A 
commercial use weighs against a finding of fair use,86 whereas a non-commercial use 
militates toward such a finding.87
Africa, Comment, The Misuse of Licensing Evidence in Fair Use Analysis: New Technologies, New 
Markets, and the Courts, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1145, 1183 (2000) (“The structure of the fair use inquiry 
emphasizes fact-intensive analysis and a delicate balancing of interests.”).
83 See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (“[E]ach case . . . 
must be decided on its own facts” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976)); 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (“The task is not to be simplified with 
bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis.”).
84 The precise inquiry undertaken by the courts is not whether the unauthorized use is part of a commercial 
work, but whether the unlicensed user exploits the copyrighted work for commercial gain.  See, e.g.,
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562 (“The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive 
of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted 
material without paying the customary price.”).
85 H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976). 
86
  See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 451 (finding that “although every commercial use of copyrighted material is 
presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright, 
noncommercial uses are a different matter.”).
87
  See id. Courts favor non-commercial uses because they are more consistent with the objectives of the 
Copyright Act to promote progress in the arts and sciences. See, e.g., Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 70.  
As to the misguided reliance on whether an unlicensed use is commercial, they write:
By misinterpreting the language of the statute and reading too much into dicta from the 
two major Supreme Court opinions on fair use, some courts have altered radically the 
traditional approach to the doctrine.  Rather than examining all of the circumstances 
bearing on [the first and fourth] factors as well as the fair use inquiry as a whole, they 
have resorted to a simplistic judgment call turning on a characterization of the use as 
either commercial or not.
Id. at 670-71 (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 539; Sony, 464 U.S. at 417; Maxtone-Graham v. 
Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1262 (2d Cir. 1986); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522 
(9th Cir. 1992); New Era Pubs. Int’l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1506-07 (S.D.N.Y. 
1988); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Eveready Battery Co. v. 
Adolph Coors Co., 765 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. 
Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. New Regina Corp., 664 F. Supp. 753 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987); Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); 
Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1979); Original 
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The second dichotomy88 is between transformative uses89 and non-transformative 
uses.90  Transformative uses that courts have looked upon favorably include 
commentaries,91 criticisms92 and parodies93 because they add value to the public domain 
Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ga. 1986); DC Comics 
Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Business, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. 
Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1176 (5th Cir. 1980); Haberman v. Hustler Magazine, 
Inc., 626 F. Supp. 201 (D. Mass. 1986)).
88 Courts take up the question of whether an unlicensed use is transformative primarily under the first fair 
use factor. Bunker, supra note 45, at 4 (“The first factor … has been the prime site for the infiltration of 
the ‘transformative use’ doctrine, although the doctrine has been considered in connection with other 
statutory factors as well.”).
89
  A transformative use alters or adds to the copyrighted work.  See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 
510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994); Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 24, at 1111 (“Transformative uses may 
include criticizing the quoted work, exposing the character of the original author, proving a fact, or 
summarizing an idea argued in the original in order to defend or rebut it. They may also include parody, 
symbolism, aesthetic declarations, and innumerable other uses.”); Laura G. Lape, supra note 75.
90 See, e.g., Bunker, supra note 45, at 2 (“The transformative use requirement is not one found among the 
statutory fair use factors, and the Court acknowledged in Campbell that a use need not be transformative to 
be fair.  Despite that caveat, the notion of transformative use has increasingly been emphasized by lower 
courts in subsequent fair use cases.”);  Ty, Inc. v. Publications Int’l, Ltd., 81 F. Supp. 2d 899, 905 (N.D. Ill. 
2000) (The books about beanie babies at issue “are not transformative, and, quite likely, not meant to be 
transformative.”); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publg. Group, Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 329, 335 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding the book nontransformative because the “chapters do not add anything substantial 
that is new to the Star Trek story”); Castle Rock Ent., Inc. v. Carol Publg. Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142 
(2d Cir. 1998) (finding “[a]ny transformative purpose possessed by The [Seinfeld Aptitude Test] […] slight 
to non-existent”); Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1401 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(finding the book at issue was not transformative because “the substance and content of The Cat in the Hat 
is not conjured up by the focus on the Brown-Goldman murders or the O.J. Simpson trial”).
91 See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1268, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001) (The 
Wind Done Gone, a novel whose storyline provided a book-length commentary on Gone With the Wind,
found to be transformative and fair); Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 21-22, 25 (1st Cir. 
2000) (replication of one photograph published alongside newspaper commentary about controversial 
photographs was transformative and fair).
92 See, e.g., Sundeman v. Seajay Socy., 142 F.3d 194, 202-03 (4th Cir. 1998) (“While [the paper] does 
quote from and paraphrase substantially Blood of My Blood, its purpose is to criticize and comment on Ms. 
Rawlings’ earliest work. Thus, Blythe’s transformative paper fits within several of the permissible uses 
enumerated in § 107.”). 
93 See, e.g., Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that an 
advertisement featuring a parody of a copyrighted photograph of Demi Moore was a transformative fair 
use) (“[T]he ad is not merely different; it differs in a way that may reasonably be perceived as commenting, 
through ridicule, on what a viewer might reasonably think is the undue self-importance conveyed by the 
subject of the Leibovitz photograph.”); Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1277.  But see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 
Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Co-op Prod., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351, 360-61 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (holding that 
theatrical work Scarlett Fever copied extensively from the plot and characters of the movie Gone With the 
Wind without providing commentary or criticism of the movie and therefore did not qualify as a parody or 
a fair use).  Some courts try to draw a further distinction between “parodies” and “satires” in light of the 
Court’s dicta in Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590-91, that “parody needs to mimic an original to make its point, 
and so has some claim to use the creation of its victim’s . . . imagination, whereas satire can stand on its 
own two feet and so requires justification for the very act of borrowing.”  See, e.g., Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d 
at 1268 (“Parody, which is directed toward a particular literary or artistic work, is distinguishable from 
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and are not mere replications of what the copyright holder has already created.94
However, courts have also acknowledged that many uses that are not transformative—
especially uses for educational and other non-commercial purposes—are also fair.95
The final dichotomy is between the use of a copyrighted work for its factual or 
historical content96 versus use for its mode of expression.97  Based on the original intent 
of U.S. copyright law—that is, to protect creative expression, but not facts, ideas, or 
history—,98 courts have looked unfavorably upon the duplication of copyrighted modes 
satire, which more broadly addresses the institutions and mores of a slice of society.”); Barban v. Time 
Warner, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4447, *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Parody is generally protected under the 
fair use doctrine as a valued form of social and literary criticism. … Satire, on the contrary, mimics the 
copyrighted work, using it as a ‘vehicle to poke fun at another target’ and is generally granted less 
protection under the fair use doctrine.”); Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1400.
94 See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (“Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for 
a finding of fair use, the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the 
creation of transformative works.”); Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 24, at 1111 (“If … [the] use adds 
value to the original—if the quoted matter is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new 
information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings—this is the very type of activity that the fair 
use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.”).
95 See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 n.11 (“[T]he obvious statutory exception to this focus on 
transformative uses is the straight reproduction of multiple copies for classroom distribution.”); Sony Corp. 
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (finding non-transformative, non-commercial 
home videotaping a fair use).
96 See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985) (“‘A Time to Heal’ 
may be characterized as an unpublished historical narrative or autobiography. The law generally recognizes 
a greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy.”); Feist Publications, Inc. v. 
Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (holding use of factual content is fair use); Einhorn, supra note 45, at
591 n.16 (“The scope of fair use is more limited with respect to non-factual works than factual works; the 
former necessarily involves more originality and creativity than the reporting of facts. … Factual works are 
believed to have a greater public value and unauthorized uses of them are more readily tolerated by 
copyright law.”) (citing New Era Publications Int’l  v. Carol Publg. Group, 904 F.2d 152, 157 (1990); 
Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 96 (1987)).
97 See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547 (“The copyright is limited to those aspects of a work—termed 
‘expression’—that display the stamp of the author’s originality.”); Holdredge v. Knight Publg. Corp., 214 
F. Supp. 921, 924 (S.D. Cal. 1963) (rejecting fair use because defendant’s work “mirrors the manner and 
style in which the plaintiff chose to set down the factual and historical material she used, and to express her 
thoughts and conclusions”).
98
  Facts, unlike expression, are part of the public domain so using them, without copying the expression 
itself, is not something to which the copyright holder has exclusive rights.  See, e.g., Dratler, supra note 70, 
at 240 (“Although copyright in a work of authorship protects the author’s particular manner of expression, 
it does not protect the underlying facts or ideas.”) (citing Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101-03, 104-05 
(1880) (copyright does not protect a system of accounting forms); Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
650 F.2d 1365, 1370-72 (5th Cir. 1981) (reporter’s research on facts in “news” not protected); Hoehling v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 978-79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980) (facts and 
speculation regarding historical event not protected); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 
F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 85 U.S. 1009 (1967) (biographical facts not protected);              
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of expression, especially for commercial purposes.99  Because facts and ideas cannot be 
copyrighted,100 the extent to which an alleged infringer copies a mode of expression (as 
opposed to facts and ideas) also touches on the second fair use factor.
2. Second Factor: “Nature of the Copyrighted Work”
Courts are required to assess “the value of the copyrighted materials used”101 and 
the extent to which the materials are at “the core of intended copyright protection.”102
According to U.S. copyright law, the need to protect and disseminate works that are 
“creative, imaginative, and original”103 is stronger than the need to protect works that are 
informational104 or functional105 at their core.106  In addition, the second factor 
encourages courts to consider whether a copyrighted work has been published, 
1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §§ 2.03[D], 2.11[A] (1988)); John R. 
Therien, Comment, Exorcising the Specter of a "Pay-Per-Use" Society: Toward Preserving Fair Use and 
the Public Domain in the Digital Age, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 979, 1005 (2001) (“Where it is not clear 
whether the information presented in the secondary use is duplicative, courts can more easily presume the 
use to be fair if the primary work is predominantly factual … ; [w]here the primary work is predominantly 
fanciful, it is further from the core of information necessary to public decision making. Therefore, a 
secondary use is less likely to present information of public value.”).
99 See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding 
that in order to be a fair use, the parody must build solely on the subject of the copyrighted work itself—a 
parody simply taking the copyrighted work’s style or tone will not constitute fair use); see also supra notes 
96-98.
100 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2003) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship 
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, 
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”); 
Y’Barbo, supra note 49, at 668 (“[C]opyright does not protect ideas but only the expression of those 
ideas.”).
101
  Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
102
  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).  
103 See, e.g., MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 182 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding “whether the work was 
creative, imaginative, and original” critical to the fair use inquiry); Haberman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 
626 F. Supp. 201, 211 (D. Mass. 1986) (fine art photographs of a surrealistic nature are creative, 
imaginative, and original and therefore deserve heightened protection); New York Times Co. v. Roxbury 
Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D.N.J. 1977);   Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 
Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 
(1982).  
104 See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (entries in telephone directory 
are informational and uncopyrightable facts).
105 See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880) (copyright on a book describing a functional system of 
bookkeeping does not grant the copyright holder exclusive rights over the subsequent use and description 
of the system); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding fair the use of 
functional elements of a computer program).
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disseminated, or otherwise made part of the public domain prior to its unlicensed use.107
Courts provide unpublished works or works that have not otherwise been publicly 
distributed greater protection in order to preserve the creator’s right to choose how and 
when a work should be published, as well as the right to decide whether to publish it at 
all.108
3.      Third Factor: “Amount and Substantiality of Portion Used”
Courts evaluate the amount and substance of the copyrighted work used by an 
unlicensed user in relation to the original work as a whole.109  A review of relevant 
cases110 reveals considerable latitude in terms of strictness, with one court holding that 
even “a small degree of taking is sufficient to transgress . . . [a fair use claim] if the 
copying is the essential part of the copyrighted work.”111  Other courts have ruled that 
using a small amount of copyrighted material that is unrelated to the work’s creative core 
106 See supra note 103.
107 See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985) (“The fact that a 
work is unpublished is a critical element of its ‘nature.’”).  
108 See id. (“[T]he scope of fair use is narrower with respect to unpublished works.”); see also Salinger v. 
Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[W]e think that the tenor of the [Harper & Row]
Court’s entire discussion of unpublished works conveys the idea that such works normally enjoy complete 
protection against copying any protected expression.”); New Era Publications Int’l , ApS v. Henry Holt & 
Co., 873 F.2d 576, 583 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Where use is made of materials of an ‘unpublished nature,’ the 
second fair use factor has yet to be applied in favor of an infringer, and we do not do so here.”); Kenneth D. 
Crews, Fair Use of Unpublished Works: Burdens of Proof and the Integrity of Copyright, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
1 (1999); Diane Conley, Author, User, Scholar, Thief: Fair Use and Unpublished Works, 9 CARDOZO ARTS 
& ENT. L.J. 15 (1990); Kate O’Neill, Against Dicta: A Legal Method for Rescuing Fair Use From the Right 
of First Publicataion, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 369 (2001).
109 See, e.g., Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984) (Use of 29 words from article of 2100 words was insubstantial and 
therefore fair use); Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1145 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982) (Use of film excerpts, though minimal, was 
qualitatively substantial).
110
 See, e.g., Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1558 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (citing Meeropol v. 
Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1071 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978)); Roy Export Co., 503 F. 
Supp. at 1145; Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 
669 (1936) (“No plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pirate.”).
111
  Cable/Home Communications Corp. v. Network Productions, Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 844 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564-65).  
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is de minimis112 and therefore does not weigh against fair use, and could even be cause to 
reject the copyright holder’s claim of infringement.113  But most courts agree that the 
extensive use of copyrighted material for the purpose of copying the mode of expression 
never constitutes fair use.114 Judges commonly make an effort to weigh the third factor 
by determining whether substantial similarities exist between the original work and the 
unlicensed use.115
4.     Fourth Factor:  “The Effect of Use Upon the Potential Market”
In one ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court asserted that the fourth factor is 
“undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use,”116 yet wide variations exist 
112 See, e.g., Werlin v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 451, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding the 
copying of two separate lines from an article “to be so fragmented as to be de minimis”); Toulmin v. Rike-
Kumler Co., 316 F.2d 232, 232 (6th Cir. 1963); Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 
DUKE L.J. 1532, 1545 n.65 (“The idea that a de minimis copying may constitute fair use has existed for 
decades and was apparently endorsed by Justice Blackmun in the Betamax case.”).
113 See Ringgold v. Black Ent., 126 F.3d 70, 76 (2d Cir. 1997).  The court reasoned that where an alleged 
infringement “makes such a quantitatively insubstantial use of the copyrighted work as to fall below the 
threshold required for actionable copying, it makes more sense to reject the claim on that basis and find no 
infringement, rather than to undertake an elaborate fair use analysis in order to uphold a defense.”  Id. See 
also Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 24, at 1116 n.52 (“Because copyright is a pragmatic doctrine 
concerned ultimately with public benefit, under the de minimis rule negligible takings will not support a 
cause of action.  The justifications of the de minimis exemption, however, are quite different from those 
sanctioning fair use.  They should not be confused.”) (citing Funkhouser v. Loew’s, Inc., 208 F.2d 185 (8th 
Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 843 (1954); Suid v. Newsweek Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146, 148 (D.D.C. 
1980); McMahon v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 1296, 1303 (E.D. Mo. 1980); Greenbie v. Noble, 151 
F. Supp. 45, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Rokeach v. Avco Embassy Pictures Corp., 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 155 
(S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
114 See supra note 99.
115
  “Substantial similarity” is also a threshold inquiry.  Courts require the copyright holder to show a 
substantial similarity between the original work and the copy to maintain a claim for copyright 
infringement.  The “substantial similarity” standard is usually used in that context.  Some courts, however, 
have, when considering the third factor, referred back to the “substantial similarity” analysis used in 
determining whether the plaintiff has a prima facie case. See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 
268 F.3d 1257, 1271-1273 (11th Cir. 2001).  Discussing the third factor, the court in Suntrust Bank stated, 
“As we have already indicated in our discussion of substantial similarity, TWDG appropriates a substantial 
portion of the protected elements of GWTW.” Id. at 1272.
116 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985).  But see Campbell, 510 
U.S. at 578 (“Nor may the four statutory factors be treated in isolation, one from another. All are to be 
explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”); Leval, Fair Use 
Standard, supra note 24, at 1124 (“Although the market factor is significant, the Supreme Court has 
somewhat overstated its importance.”).
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in terms of defining potential markets117 and the value118 of original works.  Most courts 
seem to limit their examination to the “harms” posed by unlicensed uses119  without 
117 See Africa, supra note 82, at 1155 (“Although the plain language of the statute, by using the word 
‘potential,’ indicates that copyright law recognizes injuries to some markets that the owner has not entered, 
it does not clearly state how far protection can or should extend—after all, it is hard to think of any market 
that is not in some sense ‘potential.’”); Shubha Gosh, Rights of First Entry in“Derivative Markets”: 
Exploring Market Definition in Copyright (paper prepared for Third Annual Intellectual Property Scholars 
Conference, Aug. 8, 2003) (noting courts’ varying approaches to defining market under the fourth factor), 
available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/papers/IPSC_2003_Ghosh.pdf.
118 See, e.g., Suntrust, 268 F.3d at 1274 (quoting 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT §1305[A][4], at 181 (2001) (citing Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 
F.2d 1044 (2nd Cir. 1993)) (“The fourth factor looks to adverse impact only by reason of usurpation of the 
demand for plaintiff’s work through defendant’s copying of protectible expression from such work.”); 
Triangle Publications, Inc. v Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1177 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(Difficulty in calculating the value of “TV Guide” left court unable to find any effect on the commercial 
value of that original work) (“We are simply unable to find any effect other than possibly de minimus on 
the commercial value of the copyright.”); Africa, supra note 82, at 1155 (“The ‘value of’ clause should not 
be read too literally, for to do so would bar some of the prototypical fair uses.  Take for instance a quotation 
from a work in a scathing review—presumably, this use would affect both the value of and the potential 
market for the work, because if everyone is convinced the work is bad, no one will want the work or license 
its use.”).  
119
  See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566-67 (1985) (“‘Fair use, 
when properly applied, is limited to copying by others which does not materially impair the marketability 
of the work which is copied.’  The trial court found not merely a potential but an actual effect on the 
market.”) (emphasis added) (citing MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 1.10[D], at 1-87 
(1984)); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (The fourth factor “requires courts 
to consider not only the extent of market harm caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer, but 
also ‘whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant . . . would result 
in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market’ for the original.”) (emphasis added) (quoting 
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §13.05[A][4], at 13 (1993)); Kelly v. 
Arriba 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 13562 *21 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting exact language of Campbell, supra); 
Veek v. Southern Building Code Congress Int’l , Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 824 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Fourth, Veeck’s 
use could have a substantially detrimental effect on the market for the copyrighted work. … There is no 
genuine dispute … ‘that some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting 
the language from Campbell, supra); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th Cir. 
2001) (“‘Fair use … is limited to copying by others which does not materially impair the marketability of 
the work which is copied.’ … ‘The importance of this [fourth] factor will vary, not only with the amount of 
harm, but also with the relative strength of the showing on the other factors.’  The proof required to 
demonstrate present or future market harm varies with the purpose and character of the use.”) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566-67; Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 n.21); Nunez v. Caribbean 
Int’l  News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2000) (“Our inquiry … is restrained to: (i) ‘the extent of market 
harm caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer’; and (ii) ‘whether unrestricted and 
widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant . . . would result in a substantially adverse 
impact on the potential market.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 
104, 110 (2d Cir. 1998)); Castle Rock Ent., Inc. v. Carol Publg. Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 154 (2d Cir. 
1998) (quoting exact language of Campbell, supra); Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 
110 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting exact language of Campbell, supra); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 
137 F.3d 109, 116-17 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Her only argument for actual market harm is that the defendant has 
deprived her of a licensing fee by using the work as an advertisement.”) (emphasis added); Dr. Seuss 
Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1403 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Under this factor, we consider 
both the extent of market harm caused by the publication and distribution of The Cat NOT in the Hat! and
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considering all of the market “effects”—both beneficial and harmful—as Section 107 
requires.120  When the unlicensed use is commercial and non-transformative, courts tend 
to put the burden of proof on accused infringers to establish that the copyright holder’s 
potential market has not been harmed.121  In non-commercial and transformative 
scenarios, however, the burden to show market harm122 shifts to the copyright holder.123
When analyzing that harm, courts often expand their inquiry to determine “whether 
unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the [alleged infringer] . . . 
would result in a substantially adverse impact” on the market for the original work.124
The copyright holder’s potential market includes uses that substitute for125 rather 
than merely complement126 the copyrighted work.  As such, courts consider any harm 
whether unrestricted and widespread dissemination would hurt the potential market for the original and 
derivatives of The Cat in the Hat.”) (emphasis added).
120 See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2003) (“the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.”).
121
 See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 567 (“[O]nce a copyright holder establishes with reasonable 
probability the existence of a causal connection between the infringement [for commercial purposes] and a 
loss of revenue, the burden properly shifts to the infringer to show that this damage would have occurred 
had there been no taking of copyrighted expression.”); Dratler, supra note 70, at 321 (“If the use is 
commercial, the defendant bears the burden, as is generally appropriate for an element of an affirmative 
defense.”).
122
  On the difficulty of proving market harm, see Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 567 (“Rarely will a case of 
copyright infringement present such clear-cut evidence of actual damage.”).
123 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) (“A challenge to 
a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work requires proof either that the particular use is harmful, or that if 
it should become widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work.  … 
What is necessary is a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful likelihood of 
future harm exists.”).
124 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §13.05[A][4], at 13-102.61 (1993) 
(quoted in several cases, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994); Playboy 
Enter., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1558 (M.D. Fla. 1993); Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l  News Corp., 235 
F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2000); Kelly v. Arriba 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 13562, * 21 (9th Cir. 2003); Castle 
Rock Ent., Inc. v. Carol Publg. Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 154 (2d Cir. 1998); Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. 
Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 1998); Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 
1394, 1403 (9th Cir. 1997)).
125
  Uses that are substitutes for a copyrighted work compete directly in the same market with the original 
work.  See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587.
126 See O’Rourke, supra note 82, at 1229 (“[C]ourts have used copyright fair use to excuse the 
‘intermediate’ infringement that occurs in the production of a new, complementary product.”) (citing Atari 
Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 
977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th 
Cir. 2000)); Raymond Shih Ray Kul, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New 
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from a competing work to the actual or potential derivative127 markets of the copyright 
holder128 but not harm to the copyright holder’s actual or potential ancillary markets.129
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit distinguished between 
derivative and ancillary markets in American Geophysical Union, et al. v. Texaco Inc., 
recognizing only “traditional, reasonable, or likely developed [derivative] markets” in 
determining whether the publisher suffered a market loss when Texaco researchers 
photocopied journal articles.130  While the court felt that the fourth factor ultimately 
favored the plaintiff, it did not include  the plaintiff’s alleged loss in subscription revenues
in measuring market harm, holding that it was unreasonable to assume that every 
photocopied article represented a lost journal purchase.131
As part of the inquiry into market harm, courts, such as the Second Circuit in 
Texaco, have considered the opportunity of copyright holders to license their original 
works both to the alleged infringer and to other users.132  In some circumstances, 
Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 309 n.307 (2002) (“Economists define a 
complementary good as a product whose fall in ‘price will cause the quantity demanded for the other 
product to rise.’”) (quoting Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 49 (5th ed. 1998)).
127 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2003) (“A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, 
such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound 
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, 
transformed, or adapted.  A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other 
modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a ‘derivative work.’”).
128 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 (“The enquiry ‘must take account not only of harm to the original but 
also of harm to the market for derivative works.’”) (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985)); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1274-1275 
(11th Cir. 2001) (“An examination of the record … discloses that SunTrust focuses on the value of Gone 
With the Wind and its derivatives, but fails to address and offers little evidence or argument to demonstrate 
that The Wind Done Gone would supplant demand for SunTrust’s licensed derivatives.”).
129 See, e.g., American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 935-936 (2d Cir. 1994).  An 
ancillary market is the market for goods based on or related to an original work which do not compete with 
the original work and are only tangentially related to the market for such work.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Syufy Enters., 712 F. Supp. 1386, 1389 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1989), aff’d, 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(describing the ancillary markets for motion pictures which include television and home video).
130 American Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 930.
131 Id.
132 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994) (“The market for potential 
derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works would in general develop or license 
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licensing royalties could have been realized by the copyright holder absent infringement 
and litigation.  However, in the vast majority of fair use cases, courts’ reliance on 
potential licensing revenues to expand the scope of the copyright holder’s market is 
misguided because no market exists for such licensing.133  To assume without further 
analysis that an unauthorized use causes the copyright holder to lose licensing revenues 
ends prematurely the fourth factor inquiry.   Whether a market exists for such licenses 
and, if so, the extent of such a market, is critical to the fourth factor analysis in cases 
where there is a possible benefit to the copyright holder’s market from the unauthorized 
use.  Consequently, it is imperative first to evaluate the effect of the unlicensed use on the 
copyright holder’s market apart from the possibility of unrealized licensing revenues, and 
then to factor the licensing variable into the fair use equation.
Arguably, the fourth factor exerts the strongest influence on court analyses, with 
many judges ruling against fair use claims when faced with potential negative effects on 
others to develop.”); Ty, Inc. v. Publications Int’l, Ltd., 81 F. Supp. 2d 899, 906 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (“I take as 
true the claim that defendants’ products do not harm the market for Ty’s plush toys—a point that Ty does 
not bother to dispute. I take as true that the defendants’ products do harm Ty’s market to license the use of 
its copyrights, as it has already done with six publishers.”).  
133 See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 13.05 [A][4], at 13-187 (1996) 
(“[A] potential market, no matter how unlikely, has always been supplanted in every fair use case, to the 
extent that the defendant, by definition, has made some actual use of plaintiff’s work, which use could in 
turn be defined as the relevant potential market.  In other words, it is a given in every fair use case that 
plaintiff suffers a loss of a potential market if that potential is defined as the theoretical market for licensing 
the very use at bar.”).  See also Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 70.  They note:
In an era when licensing and subsidiary rights have taken on increasing importance, the 
potential market for the copyrighted work goes well beyond the sale of copies of the 
work in its original form. Today, the market for derivative works is an economically 
important part of the copyright owner’s market, and therefore an important part of the 
incentive that drives the copyright system.  
… 
Too broad an interpretation of the potential market, however, presents its own dangers. If 
taken to a logical extreme, the fourth factor would always weigh against fair use, since 
there is always a potential market that the copyright owner could in theory license. By 
definition, once the affirmative defense of fair use is invoked, there has already been a 
finding of infringement. Accordingly, the defendant’s use necessarily falls within the area 
of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights and therefore could have been licensed.
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markets for copyrighted materials.134  However, judges have so far been inconsistent in 
cases involving potential market benefits.135  The U.S. Supreme Court has added to the 
confusion regarding the application and relevance of the fourth factor in such cases by 
failing to establish a consistent balance between the rights of copyright holders and the 
rights of the public to use creative works.
C. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Fair Use and the Fourth Factor
The Supreme Court has considered the fair use question four times since Congress 
passed the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976.136  On each occasion, the Court reanalyzed the 
fair use doctrine and reset the boundaries between the economic rights of the copyright 
holder and the public’s interest in accessing the copyright holder’s original works and 
transformations of those works.  Unfortunately, the four decisions combined have little to 
offer in terms of principled and consistent interpretations of the fourth factor.
1.      Sony Corp. of Am.  v. Universal City Studios, Inc.137
In this case, a television production company filed a copyright infringement suit 
against the manufacturers of home videotape recorders for contributing to consumers 
using the recorders to tape television programs and watch them after they had aired.  In 
reversing the appellate court, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the sale of VCRs did not 
Id. at 687-88.
134 See supra note 109.
135 See generally supra note 5.
136 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990); 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).  The Supreme Court, however, has denied petitions for certiorari to 
address the issue on several occasions.  See, e.g., Edison Bros. Stores v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 954 F.2d 
1419 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 930 (1992); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire’s Boutiques, Inc., 949 
F.2d 1482 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 911 (1992).
137 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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constitute contributory infringement of the plaintiffs’ copyrights.138  According to the 
decision, the Court arrived at a “sensitive balancing of interests” by analyzing the four 
fair use factors in the context of how consumers used the recorders.139  Based on its 
interpretation of the fourth factor, the majority found that the plaintiffs failed to 
demonstrate any likelihood of harm to the potential markets for the copyrighted works140
and, in fact, alluded to potential market increases through the practice of “time-
shifting”141—that is, expanding the viewing audience of a program and the 
advertisements aired during it by allowing viewers to watch pre-recorded television 
programs at their convenience.  The fourth factor was clearly the most important 
influence in the Court’s decision.
But the Court also asserted that determinations of fair use must be based on the 
facts and circumstances of individual cases142 and suggested that works with broad 
secondary markets might deserve greater protection because of the increased likelihood 
of commercial harm.143  The justices predicted there would be cases in which unlicensed 
uses would be unfair, as the commercial harm to the copyright holder would outweigh the 
138 Id. at 456.
139 Id. at 454-55.
140 Id. at 456 (“[R]espondents failed to demonstrate that time-shifting would cause any likelihood of 
nonminimal harm to the potential market for, or the value of, their copyrighted works.”).
141 Id. at 453-54.
142 Id. at 448 n.31 (“‘[S]ince the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is 
possible, and each case raising the question must be decided on its own facts. … The endless variety of 
situations and combinations of circumstances that can arise in particular cases precludes the formulation of 
exact rules in the statute.’”) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-66 (1976)). The Court 
was clear that it was “[a]pplying the copyright statute, as it now reads, to the facts as they have been 
developed in this case.”  Id. at 456.
143 Id. at 455 n.40 (“Some copyrights govern material with broad potential secondary markets. Such 
material may well have a broader claim to protection because of the greater potential for commercial 
harm.”).
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public interest.144  But the Court failed to offer any specific guidance for distinguishing 
between that scenario and the scenario presented in Sony.
2.     Harper & Row, Publ'rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters. 145
Interestingly, the situation the Court in Sony foreshadowed was at issue in the 
next fair use case the Court heard.  The defendant in Harper & Row published a 
magazine article containing quotations from former president Gerald Ford’s memoirs 
which were being prepared for publication.  Again, the Court considered all four fair use 
factors in emphasizing a balance between the exclusive rights of the copyright holder to 
reap financial rewards and the public’s interest in learning more about the thoughts of a 
former president146—but its decision relied heavily on the fourth factor.147  Because the 
copyright holder suffered a loss in revenue from not being the first to disseminate the 
quotations,  the Court ruled that the defendant’s use was unfair.148  According to its 
decision, the use in question adversely affected the potential market for the copyrighted 
work, which was not what Congress intended by “fair use” in the 1976 statute.149
However, the Court did not use this opportunity to clarify for the lower courts 
how to address the economic effects of unlicensed uses of copyrighted works.  Instead, 
144 See id. at 449-51.
145 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
146 Id. at 569.  But see id. at 602 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court properly focuses on whether The 
Nation’s use adversely affected Harper & Row’s serialization potential and not merely the market for sales 
of the Ford work itself.  Unfortunately, the Court’s failure to distinguish between the use of information 
and the appropriation of literary form badly skews its analysis of this factor. … whatever the negative 
effect on the serialization market, that effect was the product of wholly legitimate activity.”).
147 See id. at 569 (“[The Court of Appeals] erred, as well, in overlooking the unpublished nature of the 
work and the resulting impact on the potential market for first serial rights of permitting unauthorized 
prepublication excerpts under the rubric of fair use.”).
148 Id. at 553 (“First publication is inherently different from other [Section] 106 rights in that only one 
person can be the first publisher; as the contract with Time illustrates, the commercial value of the right lies 
primarily in exclusivity. Because the potential damage to the author … is substantial, the balance of 
equities in evaluating such a claim of fair use inevitably shifts.”). 
149 See id.
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the Court’s fact-specific analyses in Harper & Row and Sony led to further 
inconsistencies among lower courts regarding the fair use doctrine.150
3.  Stewart v. Abend151
The Stewart case goes to the heart of what benefits a copyright entails and what 
protection derivatives do or do not enjoy.  When MCA re-released Rear Window, a film 
largely based on Cornell Woolrich’s story “It Had to be Murder,” the copyright holder of 
the story152 sued for infringement.  Writing for the U.S. Supreme Court majority, Justice 
O’Connor rejected the user’s claim that the film, as a derivative, was a new work and 
therefore protected by the fair use doctrine.153  Indeed, the court said the claim went 
against the copyright laws’ express protection of derivatives.154
Before affirming the validity of the copyright, the Court examined all four fair use 
factors.  The justices ruled that the re-release was unfair because a) it was an 
unauthorized commercial use, and therefore presumptively unfair;155 b) as a work of 
fiction, the copyrighted material deserved more protection from infringement than a 
factual work;156 c) a substantial portion of the copyrighted work was used in the film;157
and d) the re-release harmed the copyright holder’s ability to market new versions of the 
150 See generally supra note 5. 
151 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
152 Woolrich had died two years before the original copyright term expired, but his executors renewed the 
copyright after Woolrich’s death and assigned the rights to Abend.  
153 Id. at 216.
154 Id. at 222-23 (“Petitioners maintain that the creation of the ‘new,’ i.e., derivative, work extinguishes 
any right the owner of rights in the pre-existing work might have had to sue for infringement that occurs 
during the renewal term.  We think, as stated in Nimmer [on Copyright], that ‘[t]his conclusion is neither 
warranted by any express provision of the Copyright Act, nor by the rationale as to the scope of protection 
achieved in a derivative work. It is moreover contrary to the axiomatic copyright principle that a person 
may exploit only such copyrighted literary material as he either owns or is licensed to use.’”) (quoting 1 
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 3.07[A], at 3-23 to 3-24 (1989)).
155 Id. at 237 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)). 
156 Id. at 237-38 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985)).
157 Id. at 238 (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564-65).
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work.158 In contrast to its previous assertion that the fourth factor was “the most 
important, and indeed, central fair use factor,”159 the Court de-emphasized the fourth 
factor by stating that “common sense” led to its conclusion that the “re-release of the film 
impinged on the ability to market new versions of the story.”160
The Court in Stewart overcame the case’s complicated chain of successive works 
and past licenses by providing exclusive rights to the then-current copyright holder.  It 
allowed the copyright holder the freedom to pursue derivative markets without analyzing 
whether those markets existed and essentially ignored fourth factor influences, 
particularly net market benefit in the form of the unlicensed use increasing interest in the 
original story.161  The movie company invested time, labor, and capital in the re-release, 
which it then lost once the re-release was deemed unfair.  Consequences to the 
entertainment industry from this decision have included producers obtaining all necessary 
copyrights, including expectancy rights,162 before producing a movie or else risk losing
their investments when copyrights change hands.163  This new hurdle negatively affected 
the public interest and private economic incentives alike as increased production costs 
likely decreased the number of new productions.
158 Id. at 238.
159 Id. (quoting 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.05[A], at 13-81 
(1989)).
160 Id. at 238.
161
  The U.S Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also dismissed the possible market benefit of the re-
release.  Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1481-82 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Under Nimmer’s hypothetical, this 
adverse effect on the owner’s adaptation rights makes the defendants’ use of the underlying work unfair. It 
is irrelevant that the re-release of the “Rear Window” film may have promoted sales of the underlying story 
in the book medium.”) (citing 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 
13.05[B], at 13-84 (1988)).
162
  “Expectancy” means “the possibility that an heir apparent, an heir presumptive, or a presumptive next-
of-kin will acquire property by devolution on intestacy, or the possibility that a presumptive legatee or 
devisee will acquire the property by will.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 598 (7th ed. 1999). 
163 See Sheldon & Mak, P.C., Looking Through the “Rear Window”: A Review of the United States 
Supreme Court Decision in Stewart v. Abend (2001), at http://www.usip.com/articles/rearwin.htm. 
33
4. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.164
In this case,165 the U.S. Supreme Court strove to balance all four fair use 
factors.166  The majority ruled that the defendant’s use could qualify as fair even though a 
song written and performed by 2 Live Crew had substantial similarities to the original 
Roy Orbison recording.167  In its ruling, the Court emphasized that the importance of the 
fourth factor varies.168  According to the Court, the fourth factor should account for “not 
only . . . harm to the original, but also of harm to the market for derivative works,”169 and 
then added that when determinations of market harm prove difficult, “the other fair use 
factors may provide some indicia of the likely source of the harm.”170  In this particular 
case, the Court found that the public interest benefits of the transformed recording were 
strong, but remanded the case so that the trial court could weigh the un certain harm to the 
copyright holder’s market.171
Interestingly, the Court failed to present anything more than a footnote on the 
potential benefit to the copyright holder’s market from the unauthorized use.  In that 
footnote, the Court suggested that even though such use may increase the primary market 
for the copyrighted work, that potential increase does not, by itself, result in fair use.172
Therefore, any market effect, such as stimulating demand for the original song, must be 
164 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
165 See Part I, supra, for a detailed description of the facts of this case.
166 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591.
167
  Plaintiff, Acuff-Rose, did not write the song.  Roy Orbison wrote the song, entitled “Oh Pretty 
Woman,” and he sold his rights in it to the plaintiff.  Id. at 571.
168 Id. at 578 (“Nor may the four statutory factors be treated in isolation, one from another. All are to be 
explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”).
169 Id. at 590 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985)).
170 Id. at 593 n.24.
171 Id. at 593.
172 See id. at 590 n.21 (citing Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 24, at 1124 n.84).
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considered along with the other factors in any fair use determination.173  Despite its 
previous concern for the economic impact of unlicensed use in Harper & Row and Sony, 
the court refused to directly confront the issue of potential market benefit in Campbell.  
The justices also offered no justification for why certain unlicensed uses should not be 
considered fair per se if they enhance a copyright holder’s market. 
These four decisions demonstrate the Supreme Court’s reluctance toward 
developing coherent guidelines for weighing the market benefit from an unlicensed use of 
copyrighted material under the fourth factor.  The absence of a clear framework leaves 
copyright holders and potential users in limbo, and shows the necessity for a consistent 
approach to protecting both the economic incentives of artists and creators as well as the 
public domain in such cases.
III. IP THEORIES, FAIR USE, AND THE FOURTH FACTOR
Each of the four predominant theories of intellectual property—utilitarian, labor, 
personality, and social planning—provide a unique perspective on reconciling the 
competing interests at the core of U.S. copyright law.174  However, these theories are 
ineffective as normative indicators of where courts should draw the line between fair and 
unfair uses of copyrighted material.  Furthermore, while it is possible to use these
theoretical perspectives to analyze cases in which an unlicensed use benefits a copyright 
holder’s potential market, they do little to help establish a consistent methodology for 
balancing that benefit with other factors in the fair use equation.
A.  Utilitarian Theory
173 See id.
174 See generally William W. Fisher, III, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL 
AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY  (Stephen Munzer ed. 2001) [hereinafter Fisher, Theories], available 
at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iptheory.pdf.
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The most widely accepted of the four theories, utilitarianism encourages wealth 
maximization as a means of promoting “general happiness” for the greatest number of 
citizens.175  Theorists who ascribe to this model believe that courts should maximize 
social welfare by balancing exclusive economic rights and incentives for the creators of 
original works with public benefits accruing through the widespread use and 
transformation of copyrighted material.176  Two of the leading proponents of this school 
of thought, William Landes and Richard Posner, believe that artists and creators cannot 
recover their “costs of expression” (i.e., time, labor, and monetary investment) when 
others duplicate or copy their works without paying licensing royalties.177  When 
unlicensed users fail to compensate copyright holders for these “costs of expression,” 
they decrease copyright holders’ market share with their lower costs of production, which 
discourages artists and authors from creating new works.178
Because maximum social welfare cannot be achieved in the absence of new 
inventions and creative works, utilitarians support an approach in which artists, writers, 
and inventors are granted exclusive rights to their works and inventions for a limited 
period of time before the intellectual property enters the public domain.179  This approach 
reflects the language in the U.S. Constitution granting Congress the power to promote 
science and the arts “by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
175
 See Fisher, Fair Use, supra note 70, at 1745 (stating that “[u]tilitarian theorists argue that our goal 
should be to identify and institute the system that would maximize ‘general happiness,’ measured by the 
sum of the pleasures minus the sum of the pains experienced by the members of the society”).
176 See Fisher, Theories, supra note 174, at 2.
177
  Landes & Posner, supra note 34.  Utilitarian theorists believe that courts should find an unlicensed use 
fair only when there exists high transaction costs to licensing.  See generally supra note 34. 
178 See Landes & Posner, supra note 34.
179 See, e.g., Edward R. Hyde, Legal Protection of Computer Software, 59 CONN. BAR J. 298, 300-1 
(1985); Wendy Lim, Towards Developing a Natural Law Jurisprudence in the U.S. Patent System, 19 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 559, 562 (2003). 
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exclusive right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”180 The current debate about 
the length of the copyright term illustrates how impossible it is to make a precise 
determination of the extent of protection needed to maximize the artist’s or author’s 
incentive to create.181
Utilitarian reasoning is frequently cited in U.S. Supreme Court decisions on 
copyright infringement.182  In Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal,183 the Court stated that “the sole 
interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the [copyright] 
monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.”184
More recently, the Court explained in Sony:
The monopoly privileges . . . are neither unlimited nor primarily designed 
to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by 
which an important public purpose may be achieved.  It is intended to 
motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of 
a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their 
genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired . . . [T]his 
task involves a difficult balance between the interests of authors and 
inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries 
on the one hand, and society's competing interest in the free flow of ideas, 
information, and commerce on the other hand.185
One issue that has never been resolved by utilitarian theorists is how to quantify 
or codify net social welfare.  Three distinct schools of thought have emerged: the 
incentive theory, the optimizing patterns of productivity theory, and the rivalrous
invention theory.  The incentive theory focuses on maximizing the creation of original 
works, and supporters believe maximization can be achieved only by offering creators an 
180 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.   
181 See Fisher, Theories, supra note 174, at 7.
182 See, e.g., Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 241-42 (1832);  Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 
How.) 322, 327-28 (1858); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 550 (1985);Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 
214-15 (2000).
183
  286 U.S. 123, 127-28 (1932). 
184
  Id. at 127.
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increased term for copyright protection.186   The optimization school of thought focuses 
on disseminating information about specific consumer demands to intellectual creators 
and encouraging them to respond to those demands.187  According to this perspective, 
consumer welfare is maximized when consumers are getting exactly what they want.188
The invention school of thought seeks to minimize the waste occurring when a large 
number of people compete to become the first creator of a work.189  Only the first creator 
will obtain the copyright; therefore, the efforts of the others constitute waste.190
Disagreements over which approach best serves the interests of creators and the public 
have added to the confusion over how to apply the fair use doctrine.
185 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
186 See Fisher, Theories, supra note 174, at 14-15 (stating that under the incentive theory “[e]ach increase 
in the duration or strength of [copyright protection] … stimulates an increase in inventive activity.  The 
resultant gains to social welfare include the discounted present value of the consumer surplus and producer 
surplus associated with the distribution of the intellectual products whose creation is thereby induced.”).  
See generally William D. Nordhaus, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT 
OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1969).
187 Fisher, Theories, supra  note 174, at 15 (stating that the utilitarian strategy of optimizing patterns of 
productivity in copyright law should be designed to “let potential producers of intellectual products know 
what consumers want and thus channel[] productive efforts in directions most likely to enhance consumer 
welfare”) (citing Paul Goldstein, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX




189 See Fisher, Theories, supra note 174, at 16 (stating that the rivalrous invention school of utilitarian 
theory seeks “to eliminate or reduce the tendency of intellectual-property rights to foster duplicative or 
uncoordinated inventive activity”) (citing Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. OF ECON. 
& STAT. 348-55 (1968); Partha Dasgupta, Patents, Priority and Imitation or, The Economics of Races and 
Waiting Games, 98 ECON. J. 66, 74-78 (1988); Partha Dasgupta & Joseph Stiglitz, Uncertainty, Industrial 
Structure and the Speed of R&D, 11 BELL J. OF ECON. 1, 12-13 (1980); Drew Fundenberg, et al., 
Preemption, Leapfrogging, and Competition in Patent Races, 77 EUR. ECON. REV. 176-83 (1983); Michael 
L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, R & D Rivalry with Licensing or Imitation, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 402 (1987); 
Steven A. Lippman & Kevin F. McCardle, Dropout Behavior in R. & D. Races with Learning, 18 RAND J. 
OF ECON. 287 (1987); Glenn C. Loury, Market Structure and Innovation, 93 Q. J. OF ECON. 395 (1979); 
Frederic M. Scherer, Research and Development Resource Allocation Under Rivalry, 81 Q. J. OF ECON. 
359, 364-66 (1967); Pankaj Tandon, Rivalry and the Excessive Allocation of Resources to Research, 14 
BELL J. OF ECON. 152 (1983); Brian D. Wright, The Resource Allocation Problem in R & D, in THE 




1.  Utilitarian Theory and Fair Use
With its focus on maximizing social welfare, utilitarianism is both supportive of 
and resistant to the fair use doctrine.  The idea that the majority of fair users make some 
effort to transform original works suggests that the fair use doctrine is socially beneficial, 
as those who want to use an original work for larger purposes, but are not able to 
overcome high transaction costs, receive protection under the fair use doctrine. It could 
be argued that fair use exerts a negative impact on societal welfare by inhibiting the 
widespread dissemination of copyrighted works, but without adequate protection against 
imitation, artists would be discouraged from investing themselves in new works, causing 
a net loss to society.191  In short, utilitarian theorists have recognized the need to balance 
countervailing public and private considerations and have developed economic models in 
support of this need, but so far these models have proven insufficient for helping courts 
strike such a balance.192
Several other factors stand in the way of applying the utilitarian theory to fair use. 
In their effort to balance creative incentives with societal benefits, utilitarian theorists 
often ignore the real costs of enforcing copyrights through litigation.193  Furthermore, the 
current ad hoc approach to fair use can stymie users who want to identify their rights, 
191 See supra note 35.  The same concerns arise in patent law.  See Lim, supra note 178, at 567 
(commenting that “[i]n the absence of protection against imitation by others, an inventor will keep his 
invention secret.  This secret will die with the inventor, and society will lose the new art.”).
192 See Fisher, Theories, supra note 174, at 16, 20 (stating, “Serious difficulties attend efforts to extract 
from any one of the [schools of thought] answers to concrete doctrinal problems. … Even if the difficulties 
specific to each of the three economic approaches could be resolved, an even more formidable problem 
would remain: there exists no general theory that integrates the three lines of inquiry.  How should the law 
be adjusted in order simultaneously (i) to balance optimally incentives for creativity and concomitant 
efficiency losses, (ii) to send potential producers of all kinds of goods accurate signals concerning what 
consumers want, and (iii) to minimize rent dissipation?”).
193 See generally Lacey, supra note 112.
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stopping potentially legitimate fair uses and negatively affecting societal welfare.194  On 
the other hand, some parties may use a work unfairly and become “free-riders” if the 
copyright holder cannot afford to litigate, reducing the incentive to create new works.195
Neither scenario upholds the utilitarian ideal.
2.  Utilitarianism and Market Benefits
The utilitarian model encourages a finding of fair use when an unlicensed use 
benefits the copyright holder’s market in cases and there are high transaction costs to 
licensing.  Not only does a larger audience gain access to the artist’s or author’s work, but 
the artist or author reaps financial benefits without additional effort.  In circumstances 
where a creator lacks the financial resources to penetrate a new market, copying can 
result in significant economic rewards.  But utilitarianism also touches on the concept of 
laches—that is, not rewarding those who “sleep on their rights.”196  According to the 
laches principle, artists and other creators who fail to enter all possible markets when 
transaction costs are low should not be allowed to restrict the entrepreneurial endeavors 
of others.197  In utilitarian terms, net social welfare is maximized when enterprising
individuals are rewarded at the same time that incentives for creators of original works 
are preserved.198  Accordingly, if the net result of an unlicensed use is a benefit to the 
copyright holder’s market, then there is no disincentive, and the use should be allowed. 
194
  Id. at 1554-8.
195 Id. at 1554.
196 See generally JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 475 (3rd 
ed. 2002); Richard H. Stern, On Defining the Concept of Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights in 
Algorithms and Other Abstract Computer-Related Ideas, 23 AIPLA Q. J. 401, 417 (1995).  “Estoppel by 
laches” is “an equitable doctrine by which some courts deny relief to a claimant who has unreasonably 
delayed or been negligent in asserting a claim.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 571 (7th ed. 1999).  
197
  See id.
198 See Landes & Posner, supra note 34.
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Copyright holders often refuse to offer licenses because of moral or artistic 
objections rather than high transaction costs.199  They seek to protect the personal or 
social values of their works, values that are disregarded in mechanical market analyses. 
Copyright holders’ unwillingness to detach themselves from their works nullifies legal 
reliance on licensing fee rationales.  Utilitarian theorists tend to conduct fair use inquiries 
in light of licensing transaction costs absent litigation, but they offer little guidance where 
there is no market for a license between the copyright holder and the unlicensed user or 
between the copyright holder and other users.  
B.  Labor Theory
Originating from John Locke’s natural rights concept, labor theory suggests that 
the state’s primary responsibility is to protect natural property rights that emerge when an 
individual creates a new work from sources with no prior ownership, i.e., resources that 
are “held in common.”200 Courts have drawn upon labor theory when acknowledging the 
importance of rewarding artists and other creators for their labor.201  For example, in 
Mazer v. Stein, Justice Reed of the U.S. Supreme Court invoked labor theory when 
199
  This is often the case with uses that are transformative, especially parodies, as artists do not want to see 
their works ridiculed.  See Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 70, at 687 (“The problem of defining the market 
is particularly acute where the use is one that the copyright owner disapproves of and is unlikely to exploit 
or authorize at any price, such as parody. As a derivative work, parody could be viewed as a potential 
market available for licensing. Because it is almost unheard of for a copyright owner to welcome or even 
willingly tolerate mockery, however, allowing him or her to retain a veto over such uses raises a real threat 
of censorship.”).
200 See Fisher, Theories, supra note 174, at 9 (citing Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright 
Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197 (1996); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and 
Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1990); Lloyd Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. 
L. REV. 1149, 1211-14 (1998)).
201 See, e.g., Jeweler’s Circular Publg. Co. v. Keystone Publg. Co., 281 F. 83, 95 (2d Cir. 1922) (holding 
that “[n]o one could legally take the results of the labor and expense which another had incurred … , and 
thereby save himself ‘the expense and labor of working out and arriving at those results  by some 
independent road’”) (quoting Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H.L.C. 815, 10 Eng. Rep. 681 (1854)); CCC 
Information Services, Inc. v. Maclean HunterMarket Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding 
that market compilations manifesting originality were entitled to protection by copyright laws); Boucher v. 
Du Boyes, Inc., 253 F.2d 948, 949-50 (2d Cir. 1958) (holding that defendants had deliberately copied 
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stating, “Sacrificial days devoted to . . . creative activities deserve rewards commensurate 
with the services rendered.”202   The majority in Mazer found protecting the incentives of 
creators a secondary concern and held that copyrighted statuettes replicated in 
manufactured lamp bases were not the type of creative works protected by U.S. copyright 
law.203
The most common criticism of applying labor theory to intellectual property law 
is that labor performed with a resource “held in common” does not necessarily entitle the 
laborer to a property right in a work that includes the commonly-owned resource.204  This 
theory also raises the difficult issue of determining which resources are truly held in 
common.  Generally accepted categories include facts, languages, cultural heritage, and 
ideas, but problems easily arise in deciding individual cases.205  Last, defining intellectual 
labor is considered an ambiguous goal, one which lacks consensus within the legal 
community.206
plaintiffs’ articles of costume jewelry and that said items were artistic in nature and therefore entitled to the 
protection of copyright laws).
202
  347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).  
203 Id.
204 See Fisher, Theories, supra note 174, at 21-22; Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: 
Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1565 (1993) 
[hereinafter Gordon, Self-Expression] (“A principle that property results from mixing labor with the 
common could be absurdly overbroad.  Thus Robert Nozick has asked ‘if I own a can of tomato juice and 
spill it into the sea . . . do I thereby come to own the sea, or have I foolishly dissipated my tomato juice?’”) 
(quoting Robert Nozick, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 175 (1974)).
205 See Fisher, Theories, supra note 174, at 24-25 (“Similar troubles arise when one tries to apply Locke’s 
conception of ‘the commons’ to the field of intellectual property.  What exactly are the raw materials, 
owned by the community as a whole, with which individual workers mix their labor in order to produce 
intellectual products?”).
206 Id. at 23 (“Perhaps the most formidable is the question:  What, for these purposes, counts as 
‘intellectual labor’?  There are at least four plausible candidates:  (1) time and effort (hours spent in front of 
the computer or in the lab); (2) activity in which one would rather not engage (hours spent in the studio 
when one would rather be sailing); (3) activity that results in social benefits (work on socially valuable 
inventions); (4) creative activity (the production of new ideas).”).
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With an emphasis on rewarding creators for their efforts, some courts have shown 
an affinity for labor theory in copyright case rulings.207  The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit in Jeweler’s Circular Publg. Co. v. Keystone Publg. Co. relied on 
labor theory in stating that “one could legally take the results of the labor and expense 
which another had incurred in the publishing of his work, and thereby save himself the 
expense and labor of working out and arriving at those results by some independent 
road.”208  But the Court did not allow such a practice, finding that the defendant infringed 
the plaintiff’s copyright on a jewelry directory.209  However, there is also ample evidence 
that more recently, some courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have generally 
discounted labor theory.210  In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Services Co.,211
the Supreme Court ruled that labor theory was inconsistent with the language of the 
Copyright Acts of 1909 and 1976:    
It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler’s labor may be 
used by others without compensation.  As Justice Brennan has correctly 
observed, however, this is not “some unforeseen byproduct of a statutory 
scheme.”  It is, rather, “the essence of copyright,” and a constitutional 
requirement.  The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor 
of authors, but “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”212
207 See Gerard J. Lewis, Jr., Comment, Copyright Protection for Purely Factual Compilations Under Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.: How Does Feist Protect Electronic Data Bases of 
Facts?, 8 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 169, 186 (1992) (“Courts have often granted 
copyright protection based solely on the compiler’s efforts, in order to protect the compiler’s investment of 
time and money expended in creating a compilation.”) (citing Jeweler’s Circular Publg. Co. v. Keystone 
Publg. Co., 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922)); Leon v. Pacific Telephone & 
Telephone Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937); Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines and Co., 905 F.2d 1081 (7th 
Cir.1990), vacated, 111 S.Ct. 1408 (1991); Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Serv. Co., 768 F.2d 
145 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1061 (1986); Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3, 
5 (7th Cir. 1977) (“[O]nly ‘industrious collection,’ not originality in the sense of novelty, is required.”)).
208 Jeweler’s Circular Publg. Co., 281 F. at 95. 
209 Id.
210 See generally Yankee Candle Company, Inc. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 
2001) (holding that there was no infringement of copyrights for labels of nine candle fragrances).
211
  499 U.S. 340 (1991) (holding that telephone directory lacked requisite originality, and as such was not 
entitled to copyright protection). 
212 Id. at 349 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 589 (1985) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
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Some scholars have questioned the legal reasoning in Feist, contending  that Congress has 
implicitly validated labor theory in not responding to Jewelers’ Circular Publg. Co.,213
and a number of lower courts continue to rely on labor theory principles. 
1.  Labor Theory and Fair Use
At first glance, the fair use doctrine and labor theory appear in conflict.  Because 
labor theorists equate copyrights with rewards for creators,214 they perceive that treating 
unlicensed uses as fair interferes with the natural rights of copyright holders.215  They 
want to ensure copyright holders are properly compensated for their investments; 
consequently, proponents of this theory argue that restricting public access to copyrighted 
works is an unavoidable by-product of safeguarding natural rights.216
Labor theory and fair use principles might harmonize in cases where unlicensed 
users transform original works.  Parodies, criticisms, and commentaries represent an 
investment of time, labor, and capital; therefore, secondary creators should arguably also 
be rewarded for their contributions to the public domain.  Nevertheless, the labor theory 
perspective could also be used to argue that unlicensed users—unlike original creators—
are not using resources “held in common,” but resources to which the copyright holder 
holds private economic rights.
2. Labor Theory and Market Benefits
213 See Lewis, supra note 207, at 191-192 (noting that the Feist Court “never cited an authority to refute 
the idea that Congress may have implicitly recognized the labor theory as a valid, albeit judicially-
developed, standard for originality in compilations”).  
214 See, e.g., id. at 186; Jeweler’s Circular Publg. Co., 281 F. at 95.
215 See Lacey, supra note 112, at 1545; Gordon, Self-Expression, supra note 204, at 1545.
216 See generally Lacey, supra note 112; Lim, supra note 179; Dane S. Ciolino & Erin A. Donelon, 
Questioning Strict Liability In Copyright, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 351 (2002).
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As an absolutist principle, labor theory generally promotes the idea that creators 
should receive ultimate control over their creations.217  Natural rights purists believe in 
protecting the “fruits” of a creator’s labor and tend to look unfavorably on unlicensed 
uses.218  But if the purpose of copyright protection is to reward creators for their 
investments, any use that enhances the copyright holder’s market should be part of that 
reward.  The absolutist position collapses when a combination of the copyrighted and 
unlicensed uses provides greater rewards to a copyright holder than the copyrighted use 
alone.  
C.  Personality Theory
Based on the writings of Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 
personality theory supports private property rights only to the extent that they “promote 
human flourishing” via the preservation of such human needs as self-expression and 
personal identity.219  According to this theory, expressive or moral rights should outweigh 
protecting the economic incentives of copyright holders.220  Personality theorists view 
copyright law as a vehicle for protecting creators against unlicensed uses that challenge 
their identities or personalities as expressed in their works.  Such protections, according 
to these theorists, promote a society that encourages intellectual creativity.221
217 See generally Susan Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Cultural Products, 81 B.U. L. REV. 793 (2001); 
Rex Y. Fujichaku, The Misappropriation Doctrine in Cyberspace: Protecting the Commercial Value of 
"Hot News" Information, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 421 (1998). 
218 See Gordon, Self-Expression, supra note 204, at 1540; Lacey, supra note 112, at 1541.
219 See Fisher, Theories, supra note 174, at 5-6.
220 See, e.g., id.; Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775, 794-6 (2003); Lacey, supra 
note 112, at 1532, 1541-43.
221 See id.
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The personality theory is popular in Europe, perhaps because its moral rights 
focus is compatible with the core of the European civil law system.222  Moral rights have 
been largely rejected in the United States,223 but according to legal scholar Justin Hughes, 
certain aspects of a creator’s personality—for instance, a painter’s artistic expression—
deserve the same protection as genetic research or other forms of labor-intensive 
intellectual activities.224  Personality theorists support the view that pursuits like painting 
and writing, as mental rather than physical activities, embody more of the creator’s 
individuality,225 and therefore the works that result should not be treated as objects that 
stand apart from their originators.226  Critics of personality theory refute the idea that 
certain human needs can clearly be determined as fundamental.  The challenge of 
defining needs as essential or peripheral is problematic when determining what forms of 
222 See generally Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright’s Joint Ownership Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 
19 (2001) (discussing personality theory’s popularity in Europe); K. M. Sharma, From “Sanctity” to 
“Fairness”: An Uneasy Transition in the Law of Contracts?, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 95, 100-01 
(1999) (explaining how moral rights are implicit in European civil law systems).
223 See, e.g., Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976) (“American copyright 
law, as presently written, does not recognize moral rights or provide a cause of action for their violation, 
since the law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than the personal rights of authors.”); Roberta 
Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1 
(1985); Monica E. Antezana, Note, The European Union Internet Copyright Directive as Even More Than 
It Envisions: Toward a Supra-EU Harmonization of Copyright Policy and Theory, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV. 415 (2003) (“Such works are not simple commodities, but rather enjoy synonymy with the 
creator’s identity.  Copyright theory, recognizing authorial importance in this way, is thus sharply 
prejudiced in favor of the author and stands, with only a few narrow exceptions, for strong copyright 
protection for authors.  It is this concept of ‘moral rights’ that the United States has hesitated to incorporate 
into its own copyright laws.”) (citing Craig Joyce, et al., COPYRIGHT LAW (5th ed. 2001)).
224
  Hughes, Philosophy, supra note 49, at 330-50.
225 See Lacey, supra note 112, at 1541-42 (citing Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegal, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT
51 (T. M. Knox trans. 1952); Immanuel Kant, Of The Injustice in Counterfeiting Books, in 1 ESSAYS AND 
TREATISES ON MORAL, POLITICAL, AND VARIOUS PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECTS 225, 229-30 (W. Richardson 
trans. 1798); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982); Martin A. 
Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. 
REV. 554, 557 (1940)).
226 See Lacey, supra note 112, at 1542.
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expression deserve protection.227   Furthermore, U.S. property law emphasizes economic 
rights which are hard to reconcile with personality theory.
1.  Personality Theory and Fair Use
Personality theory highlights the relationship between creators and their creations, 
making societal benefits a secondary concern that are often considered irrelevant.228 In 
accordance with the theory’s ultimate objective of preserving the creator’s personality, 
fair uses are largely non-existent because otherwise the use of creators’ personalities
without permission would be legitimized.229  Thus, personality theorists object to the 
potential distribution of artists’ and authors’ personalities in ways that they never 
intended; these scholars argue that fair use removes all discretion over how expressions 
of artists’ and authors’ personalities are used.230
However, personality theorists might recognize instances of fair use where the 
purpose of an unlicensed use is not to replicate the copyright holder’s mode of 
expression, and the nature of the copyrighted work at issue is more factual or functional 
than a vehicle of personal expression.231  For example, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court suggested that fair use may be easier to establish for purely 
factual compilations (such as news broadcasts) than for more expressive works (such as 
motion pictures).232  This suggestion goes to the core of personality theory.   Personality 
theorists support such a notion because it gives weight to the expressive value of art.   
227 See Fisher, Theories, supra note 174, at 28-29 (citing Jeremy Waldron, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 295-97, 302-06, 308-10 (1988)).
228
  Id. at 28-29.
229
  See id. at 9. 
230 See Lacey, supra note 112, at 1583.
231 See Hughes, Philosophy, supra note 49, at 339-44.
232
  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994) (citing Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 
237-38 (1990); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563-64 (1985); Sony Corp. 
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 n.40 (1984); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. 
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2.  Personality Theory and Market Benefits
Personality and moral theorists would probably consider the fourth fair use factor 
largely irrelevant because they discount the economic effects of unlicensed uses.233
Instead, since they emphasize rights of creators to authorize the use of their personalities, 
these theorists believe that most creators are unlikely to exchange that authority for 
monetary gain.234  In the absence of economic considerations, it is highly unlikely for 
personality theory to affect how courts weigh an unlicensed use’s beneficial effect on a 
copyright holder’s market.
Personality theory, however, fails to address the question of how to factor moral 
considerations into the fair use equation, as there is no systematic way of determining 
when unlicensed uses become affronts to creators’ self-identities or personalities.  
Copyright holders could use a moral defense as a guise for economic gain, especially 
where there are possible market benefits from an unlicensed use.  Because U.S. copyright 
law includes a strong economic bias, considering market enhancement in accordance with 
the constraints of personality theory would require a re-evaluation of the underlying 
reasons for granting copyright protection.  Consequently, the theory is perhaps more 
useful for critiquing the copyright system than for analyzing individual cases that arise 
under the current system.
D.   Social Planning Theory
Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 348-51 (1991); 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§13.05[A][2] (1993); Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 24, at 1116).
233 See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text discussing how personality theorists view economic 
concerns as secondary to creators’ moral rights. 
234
  See Hughes, Philosophy, supra note 49, at 795-96.
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Social planning theory recognizes property rights in general and intellectual 
property rights in particular when they promote the development of a just society.235
Proponents of the theory236 argue that to achieve this goal, three important changes must 
be made to current copyright law: a) the copyright term must be shortened to increase the 
number of works available in the public domain for creative manipulation; b) the 
authority of copyright owners to control the preparation of derivative works must be 
curtailed; and c) compulsory licensing systems must be created in order to balance the 
interests of creators and consumers.237  The usefulness of social planning theory in
interpreting intellectual property law is severely limited when compared to the three 
theories discussed above, especially because no universal definition exists for a “just and 
attractive society” or the elements necessary to create such a society.238 Indeed, the 
particular elements of such a society have been the subject of debates among political 
philosophers for centuries.239  Even if social philosophers could agree on the definition of 
235
  See Fisher, Theories, supra note 174, at 10.
236 See generally Fisher, Theories , supra note 174, at 10, 33-36 (advancing  social planning theory); 
Gregory S. Alexander, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY 1 (1997); Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: 
Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245 (2001) (discussing 
social planning theory); Adam Macluckie, United States v. Microsoft: A Look at the Balancing Act 
Between Copyright Protection  for Software, Intellectual Property Rights and the Sherman Antitrust Act, 2 
HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 415 (2001-2002) (same).
237 See Fisher, Theories, supra note 174, at 7-8 (citing Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a 
Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright’s 
Democratic Principles in the Global Arena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217 (1998)).  A criticism of this third 
proposal,  creating “compulsory licensing systems,” is that the proposal is an economic solution to a moral 
problem.  But it is impossible to legislate or adjudicate the methods for developing a just (moral) society.  
A spectacularly failed example of such an effort is Jeremy Bentham’s A Table of the Springs of Action, a 
lengthy work that attempts to “codify” emotions.  In the absence of objective moral criteria, it makes sense 
to rely on an economic framework to create a system for awarding rights and punishing wrongs.  
238
  Fisher presents an example of what such a society might consist of but concedes that the possibilities 
are endless.  See Fisher, Theories, supra note 174, at 33-35 (citing William W. Fisher, III, Property and 
Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203 (1998)).
239 Fisher, Theories, supra note 174, at 35 (citing ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. V, ch. 2; Bruce 
Ackerman, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); Charles Fried, Distributive Justice, 1 SOC. PHIL. 
& POL’Y 45 (1983); John Rawls, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); Michael Sandel, LIBERALISM AND THE 
LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982)).  
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a hypothetical utopia, it would be difficult to apply that vision to the specific doctrinal 
issues associated with intellectual property law.240
1.  Social Planning Theory and Fair Use
Social planning theory is consistent with fair use when a finding of fair use serves 
the public interest without inhibiting production or consumption.241  Production includes 
an artist’s or author’s motivation to create new works, and social planning theorists reject 
a use if it affects that motivation.242  Consumption includes any effects on a copyright 
holder’s potential market, and therefore social planning theorists also reject a use if it 
interferes with the copyright holder expanding current markets or accessing new ones.243
The ultimate goal of social planning theory is to stimulate progress in the sciences and 
arts,  and therefore its supporters reject uses that discourage future artists and authors 
from adding to the public domain.244  On the other hand, they support any use that 
extends creative works to people who would otherwise not have access to them.245
Social planning theorists also place importance on how fair use contributes to 
common community goals246—that is, the greater the connection of a work to a 
community’s shared values, the greater the need for fair use to support its widespread 
240
  For example, consider its application to parodies.  See Fisher, Theories, supra note 174, at 36 (“[On the 
one hand,] parody erodes the control over the meanings of cultural artifacts exerted by powerful institutions 
and expands opportunities for creativity by others.  On the other hand, parodies … may cut seriously into 
the legitimate personhood interests of the artists who originally fashioned the parodied artifacts.  Which of 
these two concerns should predominate must be determined by reflection on the cultural context and 
significance of individual cases.  The social vision on its own does not provide us much guidance.”).
241
  See Lacey, supra note 112, at 1565.
242 See O’Rourke, supra note 41.
243 See Lacey, supra note 112, at 1565-66.
244 Id. at 1565 (“The social functioning theories do not center around the property holder, but rather focus 
on society at large.  They assume that without the incentive of private property ownership, there will be no 
production of property, and society will stagnate. … These theories animate the purpose commonly 
supposed to be behind the copyright clause—to stimulate the progress of “Science and useful Arts.”) (citing 
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just 
Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1206-08 (1967)).
245 See Fisher, Theories, supra note 174, at 33.
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availability.247  These theorists believe that in most cases, it is possible to determine 
whether a work is truly or only marginally important to a community, and thus possible 
to make fair use determinations in specific cases.248  In many ways, social planning and 
utilitarian theorists share a common concern in terms of balancing the rights of copyright 
holders and the public interest.
2.  Social Planning Theory and Market Benefits
Because this theory is more inclusive and supportive of community benefits, it 
often condones (and, in some cases, encourages) uses that benefit the copyright holder’s 
market.249  According to social planning theory, a commercial use that benefits an artist’s 
market is also likely to benefit the public.  In a non-commercial setting, when copying 
meets a community’s need for education and awareness, the unlicensed user is providing 
a public service.250  Social planning theorists believe that in both cases, the community 
benefit outweighs the need to preserve the original artist’s exclusive rights.251
In copyright cases with a net market benefit, social planning theory does not 
appear to disparage economic motives in the way that personality theory does.  Rather, 
246 See Lacey, supra note 112, at 1585-95.
247 See id. at 1586-87 (“In the context of the fair use defense, a communitarian-based definition of the 
‘public interest’ not only is desirable for philosophical reasons, it also is the only one that makes sense. … 
The proper perspective on the fair use defense focuses on the extent that the work contributes to the 
common goals of the community.  The greater the relationship of the work of art to the shared values of the 
community, the greater the need for widespread availability.”) (citing Fisher, Fair Use, supra note 70, at 
1744-79).
248 See Lacy, supra note 112, at 1585-95.
249 See id. at 1593.
250 See generally id. at 1588-90 (“Political information, which contributes to the debate about the very 
nature of our government and its policies, is of the greatest value to a community.  This is the explicit 
assumption the Supreme Court repeatedly has applied in giving the greatest first amendment protection to 
political speech.  If it is correct, then information serving this first amendment interest should constitute the 
most ideal example of fair use.  For example, photographs of the Vietnam War’s My Lai massacre provided 
a universal benefit by increasing awareness of and stimulating debate on the country’s military policy.  
Educational and artistic works similarly satisfy important public needs.”).
251 See generally id. at 1586-87 (“The greater the relationship of the work of art to the shared values of the 
community, the greater the need for widespread availability.”).
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the benefit to the copyright holder’s market combined with the public’s access to 
additional works is a step toward developing a more just society.  Therefore, any scenario 
that provides positive outcomes for both private creators and the public should be 
consistent with social planning theory.  
****
The search for theoretical underpinnings to address the issue of fair use provides 
much knowledge but little guidance.  While proponents point to copyright scenarios 
rooted in their particular ideas, the reality is that each theory has its own “ambiguities, 
internal consistencies, and [a] lack of empirical information,”252 all of which prevent 
theory alone from offering a concrete solution to how courts should balance the 
competing rights of copyright holders and the public.  Nevertheless, these theories do 
illuminate key areas, such as the importance of protecting private economic rights 
juxtaposed with enhancing the quality and quantity of new works accessible to the public, 
which will support the fair use framework explained in this article.
IV.  MARKET ENHANCEMENT AND THE COURTS
In 1922, a U.S. district court considered the possible beneficial effects to the 
copyright holder’s market from the playing of music in a movie theater (without the 
copyright holder’s permission), and ruled that the possible increase in sales of the original 
music was immaterial to the allegations of infringement.253  The subsequent evolution of 
fair use law makes it doubtful any court today would rule the same way, but there 
remains a considerable amount of inconsistency in how courts weigh the potential 
252 See Fisher, Theories, supra note 174, at 13 (“Unfortunately, all four theories prove in practice to be less 
helpful in this regard than their proponents claim.  Ambiguities, internal inconsistencies, and the lack of 
crucial empirical information severely limit their prescriptive power.”).
253
  Harms v. Cohen, 279 F. 276, 279 (D. Pa. 1922).
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benefits to a copyright holder’s market from an unlicensed use.  In this section, I will 
identify patterns in the rulings of various courts which have considered market benefit, 
beginning with cases in which courts did not find fair use under such circumstances and 
ending with cases in which courts did.254
A. Findings Against Fair Use
Courts have created various rationales for discounting the possible benefit to a 
copyright holder’s market from an unlicensed use.  According to one rationale, the loss of 
licensing royalties from an unlicensed use generally outweighs the potential sales 
revenues from an increased market. A second rationale is that unlicensed uses may 
eliminate copyright owners’ abilities to enter new markets and license their works to 
other users.  In a third category of cases, courts have found unfair an unlicensed use 
because the unauthorized user acted in bad faith.
1.  Preserving the Copyright Holder’s Right to License to User
Courts have repeatedly found unlicensed uses unfair where they have perceived 
that the copyright holder lost (real or fictitious) opportunities to receive financial benefits 
from licensing the copyrighted work to an unlicensed user.  In DC Comics, Inc. v. Reel 
254
  Of the courts that have mentioned market benefit, some have considered it more fully than others.  In 
certain cases, courts refuse to consider evidence of market enhancement.  See, e.g., Adv. Computer Serv. of 
Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 366 (E.D. Va. 1994); Wojnarowicz v. Am. Fam. Assn., 
745 F. Supp. 130, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Telerate Sys., Inc. v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221, 229-230 (S.D.N.Y. 
1988); Update Art, Inc. v. Maariv Israel Newsp., Inc., 635 F. Supp. 228, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Horn Abbot 
Ltd. v. Sarsaparilla Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 360, 367-68 (N.D. Ill. 1984).  In other cases, the court itself seems to 
be raising the issue of potential market benefit, often in dicta, during its consideration of the fourth factor.  
See, e.g., Amsinck v. Colum. Pictures Indus., 862 F. Supp. 1044, 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Weissmann v. 
Freeman, 684 F. Supp. 1248, 1262 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 606 F. 
Supp. 1526, 1539-1540 (C.D. Cal. 1985); Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1263-1264 (2d 
Cir. 1986); Educ. Testing Serv. v. Stanley H. Kaplan, Educ. Ctr., Ltd., 965 F. Supp. 731, 736 (D. Md. 
1997).  Finally, some courts weigh market benefit in their fair use analysis.  See, e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. 
v. Buena Vista Home Ent., Inc., 192 F. Supp. 2d 321, 342-43 (D.N.J. 2002); L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters 
Television Int’l, Ltd., 942 F. Supp. 1265, 1273-1274 (C.D. Cal. 1996).  The rest of the cases in this third 
category are discussed in the remainder of Part IV.
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Fantasy, Inc.,255 Reel Fantasy named one of its comic book stores “The Batcave” and 
displayed in its advertising a large number of symbols from the Batman comic book 
series, which was copyrighted by DC Comics.256  DC Comics sued for copyright 
infringement, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a district 
court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant on its fair use claim.  The 
court stated that by using the “Batcave” name and Batman symbols without permission, 
Reel Fantasy robbed DC Comics of the opportunity to license its copyrights to the comic 
book store in order to earn royalties.257  According to the appellate court, even though 
Reel Fantasy had advertised Batman comic books—which might have increased sales of 
the plaintiff’s products—the potential market for licensing was actually decreased,258
with the copyright holder being in “the best position to balance the prospect of increased 
sales against revenue from a license.”259  Ironically, the court never analyzed whether a 
market for such a license existed.
 The case of Iowa State U. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcast Co., 
Inc.260 presents an example of circumstances under which a market to license the 
copyrighted work to an unlicensed user probably did exist.  The federal district court 
found—despite that the unlicensed copying possibly enhanced the copyright holder’s 
market—that the American Broadcasting Company’s (ABC’s) use in their Olympic 
255
  696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982).
256 Reel Fantasy also used images of Batman and Green Arrow (another copyrighted character of DC 
Comics) in its store displays.
257
  Id.  
258
 Id.  
259 Id.  For an example of a court making a similar finding, see Ringgold v. Black Ent., 126 F.3d 70, 80-81 
(2d Cir. 1997).  When HBO used Faith Ringgold’s poster, “Church Picnic,” as a set decoration without 
permission, the copyright holder argued that she was denied the opportunity to negotiate a licensing fee for 
use of the poster, which she had done with other users in the past.  The court, in an opinion which 
referenced DC Comics, 696 F.2d at 28, found, “Even if the unauthorized use of plaintiff’s work in the 
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Games broadcasts of the plaintiff’s copyrighted videotape of an Olympic wrestler 
violated the plaintiff’s right to license the work to ABC.261   The court also noted that 
royalties would have exceeded any possible benefit to the plaintiff’s market.262 The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed, adding that the plaintiff’s potential 
licensing revenues which could have been realized by the plaintiff were especially critical 
because the defendant had a monopoly on the Olympic Games coverage.263
One court took the licensing variable a step further and defined its role as 
protected the copyright holder’s choice of whether to license its work, even if it would 
have chosen not to do so.  In Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of Month Club,264 the 
defendant (a shareware distribution company) provided versions of the plaintiff’s 
truncated shareware to its customers.  The plaintiff offered the public free access to the 
same two truncated computer games via the Internet, but members of the public had to 
pay a registration fee to the plaintiff if they wanted full access to the games.  The 
defendant claimed that by distributing the plaintiff’s truncated shareware, it increased the 
demand for the plaintiff’s complete software product.265  But the plaintiff contended that 
it received complaints from potential customers about both the defendant’s poor technical 
support and payment of a registration fee to the plaintiff after the defendant had already 
been paid, both of which, the plaintiff argued, reduced the chances that users would buy 
televised program might increase poster sales, that would not preclude her entitlement to a licensing fee.”  
Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 81 n.16 (citing DC Comics, 696 F.2d at 28).
260
  621 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1980).
261 Iowa State U. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcast Co., Inc., 463 F. Supp. 902, 905 (D.C.N.Y. 
1978).
262 Id. at 905.
263 Iowa State, 621 F.2d at 62.
264
  13 F. Supp. 2d 782, 789-790 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
265 Id. at 788.
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the complete version of the software.266  The court accepted the plaintiff’s contention,267
while shortchanging the defendant’s evidence of possible market enhancement.
In dismissing the defendant’s argument, the Illinois federal district court quoted 
the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters. in 
which the Court stated that “any copyright infringer may claim to benefit the public by 
increasing public access to the copyrighted work . . . but Congress has not designed, and 
we see no warrant for judicially imposing, a ‘compulsory license’ [on copyrighted 
works].”268   At the heart of the district court’s decision was the belief that whether the 
plaintiff would have licensed the shareware to the defendant was irrelevant as the court 
only had to preserve the copyright holder’s hypothetical choice of whether to license its 
shareware.   Such analysis conflicts with that used by the courts in DC Comics, Inc. and 
Iowa State.   The courts in those cases appeared to find that the royalties they believed the 
copyright holders would have earned by licensing their copyrights offset any benefit to 
the copyright holders’ markets.
2. Preserving the Copyright Holder’s Right to License to Others
In other cases, courts rejected evidence of unlicensed uses benefiting copyright 
holders’ markets where copyright holders claimed that they had been deprived of 
opportunities to license their works to other users.269  For instance, in Rubin v. 
266 Id. at 786.
267 Id. at 789.
268
  Id. at 790 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 417 U.S. 539, 569 (1985)).
269
  For a contemporary example of a court accepting this rationale, see UMG Recordings, Inc. v. 
MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), a case concerning MP3.com’s practice of 
copying CDs onto its server and allowing subscribers to download the music without paying any licensing 
fee to the plaintiffs.  The court found that the “defendant’s activities on their face invade plaintiffs’ 
statutory right to license their copyrighted sound recordings to others for reproduction” and denied the 
defendant’s fair use claim.  Id.
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Brooks/Cole Publg. Co.,270 a publisher included the plaintiff’s copyrighted “Love Scale” 
(a self-test for students) in its Social Psychology textbook.  The Massachusetts federal 
district court expressed doubt that the defendant’s actions created a “meaningful 
likelihood of harm to the current or potential markets for Rubin's existing or future 
textbooks and anthologies,”271 and even went so far as suggesting that publication of the 
“Love Scale” might have benefited the plaintiff’s market for the copyrighted self-test.272
Nevertheless, the court emphasized how the publisher’s unauthorized use interfered with 
Rubin’s ability to obtain licensing fees from other textbook publishers, and enjoined the 
publishing company from publishing additional text books that included the “Love Scale”
included.273  In a partial victory for the defendant (and perhaps in recognition of the 
possible benefit to the plaintiff’s potential market), the court did not award any monetary 
damages to the plaintiff.274
Several years later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reinforced 
the copyright holder’s exclusive right to license works to others.  In Castle Rock Ent., 
Inc. v. Carol Publg. Group, Inc.,275 the plaintiff (a television production company) filed 
suit for copyright infringement against the defendant-publishing company after the 
defendant published a trivia book with questions originating from the plaintiff’s Seinfeld
television program.  On appeal, the court upheld the decision of the district court (which 
denied the defendant’s fair use claim), even though the appellate court admitted that the 
270
  836 F. Supp. 909, 921-22 (D. Mass. 1993).




  Id. at 925.  The court weighed the possibility of such licensing royalties even though, as the court 
admitted, the plaintiff had authorized other textbook publishers to publish his “Love Scale” free of charge 
and there was no established market for such licenses.  See id. at 922.   
274
  See id. at 925.
275
  150 F.3d 132, 133 (2d Cir. 1998).
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book may have increased market demand for the television program.276  The court ruled 
that the plaintiff had a monopoly over the right to license or publish derivative works, 
even though it had no intention of doing so.277
In two similar cases, the courts also denied fair use claims to protect the licensing 
rights of copyright holders in derivative markets.  In Twin Peaks Productions, Inc. v. 
Publications Intl., Ltd.,278 the defendants published detailed plot summaries of Twin 
Peaks television episodes in a book about the television show, and the copyright holder 
of the Twin Peaks program sued for infringement.  In denying the defendants’ fair use 
claim, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that even though the 
“appellants [including PIL, publisher of the book Welcome to Twin Peaks: A Complete 
Guide to Who’s Who and What’s What,] may be correct in arguing that works like theirs 
provide helpful publicity and thereby tend to confer an economic benefit on the copyright 
holder, we nevertheless conclude that the book competes”  with the production 
company’s market interests in licensing plot summaries to other users.279
Similarly, in Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publg. Group, Inc.,280 a New 
York federal district court found that an unauthorized Star Trek book interfered with the 
plaintiff's market for licensing guidebooks and other derivative works related to its Star 
Trek television program.  Both in Twin Peaks and Paramount Pictures, the courts 
276 Id. at 146.
277
 Id. at 145-146. In this case, the court seems to be protecting the plaintiff’s rights to develop its 
derivative markets even though it had no intention of doing so.  Compare Infinity Broad. Corp. v. 
Kirkwood, 150 F.3d  104, 111 (2d Cir. 1998) (denying fair use claim where unlicensed user entered 
derivative markets which the copyright holder had an undisputed ability and willingness to pursue);
Higgins v. Detroit Educ. Television Found., 4 F. Supp. 2d 701, 708-710 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (stating, 
“Where, on the other hand, the copyright holder clearly does have an interest in exploiting a licensing 
market—and especially where the copyright holder has actually succeeded in doing so—it is appropriate 
that potential licensing revenues for photocopying be considered in the fair use analysis.”).  
278
  996 F.2d 1366, 1377 (2d Cir. 1993).
279 Id. at 1377.
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protected what they perceived as the copyright holders’ exclusive rights to license their 
works to other users.  In doing so, however, they begged the question of whether there 
was a market for such licenses in the first place.
3. Protecting Copyright Holders Against Unauthorized Users’ Bad-Faith Motives
The current J.K. Rowling suit against the New York Daily News likely falls within 
this subcategory of fair use cases.  While the author of the Harry Potter series would 
most certainly not have licensed pre-release excerpts of Harry Potter and the Order of 
the Phoenix to the New York Daily News  (even though pre-release publication of the
excerpts possibly increased her market for the book), the newspaper’s motives likely 
militate against a finding of fair use.  The newspaper had an undisputed profit motive to 
copy and publish the excerpts—to sell more newspapers than it would have sold 
otherwise—and presumably did so knowing of the potential illegality of copying from  a 
book that had yet to be publicly disseminated.  This, in combination with the damaging 
effect to the plaintiff’s reputation from the publication of her work in a tabloid 
newspaper,281 could influence a court to rule in Rowling’s favor.
Some courts have considered the alleged infringer’s bad-faith motives in finding a 
use unfair282 even though no court has done so in the context of considering whether the 
280
  11 F. Supp. 2d 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
281
  Theo Wilson, renowned criminal trial reporter, left the New York Daily News after publicly decrying the 
editors as “short sighted” and “mourning the decline of a ‘world-class tabloid.’” Eric Drogin & Mary-
Margaret Hornsby, Book Review, Headline Justice: Inside the Courtroom – The Country’s Most 
Controversial Trials by Theo Wilson,  FED. LAW., Oct. 1997, at 42.  
282 See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 1991); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. 
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1036 (N.D. Ga. 1986); DC Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited 
Monkey Business, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110, 118-19 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 
F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).  But see Leval, Fair Use Standard, supra note 24, at 1126.  Leval 
considers “good faith” to be a “false factor.”  Id.  He finds that factoring in good or bad faith when 
determining fair use “produces anomalies that conflict with the goals of copyright and adds to the 
confusion surrounding the doctrine.”  Id.  A contract model for intellectual property, such as the one 
suggested in Part VI, infra, overcomes Leval’s concern because, in contract law, the motive of the 
breaching party has historically been irrelevant.  
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use benefited the copyright holder’s market.283  Courts usually consider the unlicensed 
user’s motives in connection with the first factor.284 For instance, in Tin Pan Apple, Inc. 
v. Miller Brewing Co., Inc., the defendants copied the appearance and sound of the rap 
group Fat Boys in a beer commercial.285 The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint 
on the ground that their  use was fair, but the court denied the motion and found that the 
defendants had likely acted in bad faith because they “had contacted plaintiffs … to 
appear in such a commercial but [plaintiffs] had declined.  … Subsequently defendants 
put together the commercial in suit, using look-alikes of the individual plaintiffs.”286
The court concluded, “[I]t requires no effort to infer that, having been rebuffed by 
plaintiffs for such a commercial, defendants Miller and Backer proceeded to copy them.  
The finders of . . . fact could equate such conduct with bad faith and evasive motive on 
defendants’ part.”287
The court did not find it necessary to consider all four fair use factors once it 
concluded that the defendants’ use was not a parody.288  So while the court did not 
consider explicitly whether the unlicensed use increased the rap group’s market for its 
work, such increase was possible, which the court would have overlooked in focusing on 
the motives of the alleged infringer.
283
  This category is included anyway because conceivably a court could discount evidence of a benefit to a 
copyright holder’s market in light of evidence that the unlicensed user acted in bad faith.
284 In Rogers v. Koons, the court described the first factor as “whether the original was copied in good faith 
to benefit the public or primarily for the commercial interests of the infringer. …  Knowing exploitation of 
a copyrighted work for personal gain militates against a finding of fair use. And—because it is an equitable 
doctrine—wrongful denial of exploitative conduct towards the work of another may bar an otherwise 
legitimate fair use claim. …” 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 
182 (2d Cir. 1981); 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.05[A][1] 
(1991)).
285
  737 F. Supp. 826, 827-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
286 Id. at 832.
287 Id. at 833.
288 Id. at 832.
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B. Findings of Fair Use
In addition to sanction by Congress, legal precedent exists for findings of fair use, 
especially in cases where the unlicensed use potentially benefits the copyright holder’s 
market.   Where such beneficial market effects exist, courts have clearly demonstrated 
their acceptance of uses that: a) are transformative, b) fulfill a public purpose, or c) pass 
the Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. balancing test. 
1. Transformative Use Cases
Courts have regularly cited evidence of possible market enhancement289 in 
supporting fair use claims where the unlicensed uses are transformative.290  Even if those 
uses are part of commercial works, courts have looked favorably upon them because they 
289
  Although a discussion of transformative use cases in which courts conclude that there is no evidence of 
market harm (but fail to consider possible market benefit) are beyond the scope of this article, courts 
resolve those cases the same way.  See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1274-
1275 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that a parody of Gone With the Wind, in which the author critiqued the 
original work’s treatment of slaves in the pre-Civil War South, was a transformative, socially beneficial fair 
use because the book did no harm to the copyright holder’s potential market).  Courts talk about market 
enhancement, in part, to emphasize that there is no possibility of market harm, so it is not necessarily the 
case that where courts do not mention market benefit, there is no net benefit to the copyright holder’s 
market.  Although the court in Suntrust Bank did not say so explicitly, transformative uses, by their very 
nature, increase demand for original works.  See, e.g., Jackson v. Warner Bros, Inc., 993 F. Supp. 585, 591 
(E.D. Mich. 1997) (noting that the depiction of artist’s copyrighted paintings within a movie scene did 
more to increase demand for the paintings than to hurt the artist’s market).
290
  A transformative use is a use generally recognized as adding to the original, copyrighted work.  See 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (framing question of transformative use as 
“whether the new work merely ‘supersedes the objects’ of the original creation or instead adds something 
new”) (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass 1841)); Sony, 464 U.S. at 478 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (holding that the key question as to whether defendant’s use is transformative is 
whether it “result[s] in some added benefit to the public beyond that produced by the first author’s work”); 
Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News Co., 235 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding reproduction of controversial, 
copyrighted modeling pictures in a newspaper is fair use because “it is this transformation of the works into 
news—and not the mere newsworthiness of the works themselves—that weighs in favor of fair use under 
the first factor of § 107”); Matthew C. Staples, Note, Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
69 (2003).  Making an exact copy of the original work, even if it is for educational or research purposes, is 
generally not recognized as a transformative use.  See, e.g., American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 60 
F.3d 913, 924 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that “the concept of a ‘transformative’ use would be extended 
beyond recognition if it was applied to [defendant’s] copying simply because he acted in the course of 
doing research”); Loren, supra note 38, at 30 (stating that courts view transformative users more favorably 
because they “creat[e] new works that are adding value to society,” whereas non-transformative users are 
disfavored because their uses “do not involve any transformation of the authorship elements of the pre-
existing work;” classroom copies are non-transformative yet fair because they are “productive”).
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enhance the public domain instead of merely superseding the original works.291  At the 
same time, such uses do not undermine the economic incentives of artists and creators 
because, in these circumstances, copyright holders receive more of an economic benefit 
than they would have received absent the unlicensed use.292  In these cases, courts have 
attempted to balance all four fair use factors, but in practice they have tended to give 
greatest weight to the fourth factor.
For instance, the plaintiff in Hofheinz v. AMC Prod., Inc.293 held the copyrights to 
many films produced by her late husband, James Nicholson, and sought to enjoin the 
defendants from using clips of those films in a documentary about Mr. Nicholson’s
movie production company.  The New York federal district court found the plaintiff was 
unlikely to succeed on the merits of her claim because the defendants could successfully 
avail themselves of a fair use defense.294  The court specifically emphasized the 
defendants’ transformative use of the film clips295 in making a documentary to educate 
the public.296  Furthermore, in reference to the fourth factor, the court commented on the 
likelihood that the documentary would increase the market demand for the plaintiff’s 
copyrighted works.297  This case is facially consistent with the balancing test outlined in 
Campbell because the court analyzed all four fair use factors, even though the court 
291 See, e.g., supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
292 Id. 
293
  147 F. Supp. 2d 127 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
294 Id. at 136-37.
295
  See id. at 137-38.
296 Id. (“[D]efendants’ [d]ocumentary will likely be found to be “transformative” on the trial of this matter; 
it does not merely purport to supersede the original works at issue, but to create a new copyrightable 
documentary.  While plaintiff’s copyrighted movies aimed to entertain their audience, defendants’ 
[d]ocumentary aims to educate the viewing public of the impact that Arkoff and Nicholson had on the 
movie industry. … The commercial nature of the [d]ocumentary, while significant, is not dispositive in 
light of the [d]ocumentary’s transformative nature.”) (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 
569, 584 (1994)).
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rested its decision on the fourth factor after determining that the defendants’ use was 
transformative in that it added to rather than merely copied the copyrighted movies.298
In Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp.,299 the plaintiff-photographer sued a 
newspaper for copyright infringement when the newspaper printed copyrighted 
photographs of “Miss Puerto Rico” alongside articles about the public controversy 
surrounding the beauty pageant winner.  The Puerto Rico federal district court entered 
judgment in favor of the newspaper on its fair use claim, and the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit affirmed, ruling that the transformative use of the photographs300—as 
part of news articles to educate the public—offset the fact that the pictures were included 
in a commercial work.301  In its reference to the fourth factor, the court stated that the 
“only discernable effect [of the unlicensed use] was to increase demand”302 for the 
photographer’s work.  The court also noted that the relevant market was not the 
photographer’s market for selling photographs generally but rather the market for selling 
297
  Id. at 137 (“The [d]ocumentary appears intended to add something of value rather than simply copying 
the copyrighted expression that it documents. Indeed, it seems likely to stimulate a market for the original 
rather than replace it.”).
298
  In two similar cases, courts relied on the same considerations to find fair use.  First, in Video-Cinema 
Films, Inc., v. Cable News Network, the defendant aired footage of the plaintiff’s copyrighted film (The 
Story of G.I. Joe) during news stories about the death of actor Robert Mitchum.  2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
15937 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).  In holding that the use of the film clips was a fair use, the court stated that as to 
the fourth factor, the clips do not compete with the original film, but might increase demand for the film, id. 
at *30, *30 n.20, and rejected the claim that plaintiff was denied an opportunity to license uses of the film 
to the defendant or to other users.  Id. at *30-31. 
Second, in Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., the defendant wrote a biography of author Richard 
Wright that included excerpts of Wright’s published and unpublished works.  953 F.3d 731 (2d Cir. 1991).  
The court found the defendants’ use of Wright’s works fair.  Id. at 740.  As to the fourth factor, the court 
observed that “[i]mpairment of the market … is unlikely,” and the use may in fact stimulate interest in the 
original works, thus increasing their market.”  Id. at 739.
299 235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000). 
300 Id. at 22 (“The more ‘transformative’ the new work, the less the significance of factors that weigh 
against fair use, such as use of a commercial nature.”).   
301 See id. at 22-23 (“[B]y using the photographs in conjunction with editorial commentary, El Vocero did 
not merely ‘supersede the objects of the original creations,’ but instead used the works for ‘a further 
purpose,’ giving them a new ‘meaning, or message.’”) (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 
569, 579 (1994)).
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or licensing the reproduced photographs.303 In addition to possible benefit to the 
copyright holder’s market, the court found that since there was no potential market for 
licensing the reproduced photographs to any newspaper, the photographer could not make 
the claim that he had lost potential licensing fees.
2. Per Se Cases
A number of courts have made per se findings of fair use304 in cases in which an 
unlicensed use enhances the copyright holder’s potential market, regardless of the alleged 
infringer’s purpose in using the copyrighted work.  The per se precedent exists despite 
the statutory mandate to weigh all four factors in fair use claims,305 and despite warnings 
in Campbell that lower courts should not rely exclusively on the fourth factor when 
making fair use determinations.306
a. Public Use307
302 Id. at 25 (citing Amsinck v. Colum. Pictures Indus., 862 F. Supp. 1044, 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); 
Haberman v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 626 F. Supp. 201, 212-14 (D. Mass. 1986)).  
303 Id. at 24 (“[W]e should limit our analysis to the effect of the copying on the market for the reproduced 
photographs. The overall impact to Nunez’s business is irrelevant to a finding of fair use.”). 
304
  As early as 1965, a court focused exclusively on the fourth fair use factor in noting that defendants 
would have prevailed on its fair use claim had plaintiff established  a prima facie case of infringement. See 
Mura v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 245 F. Supp. 587, 589 (D.C.N.Y. 1965).  The defendants used the 
plaintiff’s copyrighted hand puppets on their television show, and the court found that there was no 
copyright infringement because such use did not fit the definition of “copying.” Id. at 589.  But the court 
went on to consider the fair use question anyway and found that had infringement occurred, defendants’ use 
was fair because, if anything, the defendants increased sales of plaintiff’s puppets as defendants’ use of the 
puppets did not substitute for the plaintiff’s sales.  Id. at 589.  The court made its finding without 
considering other factors.  Id.
305 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (2003) (stating, “In determining whether the use made of a work in any 
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include,” the four factors listed within the 
statute); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984) (interpreting 
the House Report on § 107 as “expressly stat[ing] that the fair use doctrine is an ‘equitable rule of reason,’” 
and Senate Committee Reports as finding “while not conclusive with respect to fair use, [the fourth factor] 
can and should be weighed along with other factors in fair use decisions.”); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. 
v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985) (interpreting § 107 as requiring the consideration of all four 
factors because “[t]he statutory formulation of the defense of fair use in the Copyright Act reflects the 
intent of Congress to codify the common law doctrine,” and thus it “requires a case-by-case determination 
whether a particular use is fair, and the statute notes four nonexclusive factors to be considered.”).
306
  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).  
307
  A public use is one that furthers a governmental purpose such as education, public adjudication or 
criminal justice.  See Part V, infra.  Transformative uses, by their very nature, are public uses because they 
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In a post-Campbell decision,308 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
relied exclusively on the fourth factor in determining that the defendant’s use of the 
plaintiff’s copyrighted games during a children’s gaming tournament would have 
constituted fair use had there been a prima facie case of infringement.  The court 
reiterated that Section 107 of the Copyright Act “allows the fair use of a copyrighted 
work in such instances as for nonprofit educational purposes and where the effect of the 
use upon the potential market for or value of the protected work is limited.”309  The court
then noted that the “potential market for the subject games has in all likelihood increased 
because participants of the [gaming] tournament have had to purchase Allen’s games.”310
Resting its decision on the fourth factor, the court made only a fleeting reference to the 
first three factors.311  The court stated, “Analysis of other factors involved in § 107 leads 
this court to conclude that the application of the fair use doctrine in this case is clearly 
appropriate.”312  Even though the defendant’s use was not transformative, the court would 
have allowed it had there been copying because it served the public purpose of education.  
b. Private Use313
enhance the arts.  The author believes that the dichotomy between commercial and non-commercial uses is 
over-emphasized.  Some courts agree.  See, e.g., Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 109 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (“We also note that the district court placed little or no emphasis on the commercial nature of 
Dial-Up. We agree that, notwithstanding its mention in the text of the statute, commerciality has only 
limited usefulness to a fair use inquiry; most secondary uses of copyrighted material, including nearly all of 
the uses listed in the statutory preamble, are commercial. As the Supreme Court observed in Campbell, to 
give commerciality a ‘presumptive force against a finding of fairness,’ would render the preamble a 
nullity.”) (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584) (citing Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publg. 
Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141-42 (2d Cir. 1998); American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913, 
921 (2d Cir. 1994))
308 Allen v. Academic Games League of Am., Inc., 89 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 1996).





  A private use is a use that is non-transformative and does not promote a governmental purpose, 
including many religious and some commercial uses.  See Part V, infra.
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The court’s decision in Haberman v. Hustler Mag., Inc.314 illustrates the per se
approach in a case where the unlicensed use was private.  The copyright holder of two 
surrealistic (fine art) photographs initiated a lawsuit against Hustler Magazine for 
publishing images of commercially available postcards of the photographs.  Although the 
opinion included a discussion of the first three factors, the court apparently dismissed the 
magazine’s profit motive and relied on the fact that the postcards were publicly 
disseminated to negate the need to protect the artist’s private economic rights.315 The 
court held that the plaintiff’s case “fatally falter[ed]” on the fourth fair use factor because 
the defendant’s use of the postcards had no effect on the sale, licensing, or exhibition of 
the plaintiff’s photographs.316 Perhaps more significantly, the court emphasized that 
postcard sales of the two copyrighted works increased after their publication in Hustler 
Magazine,317 evidence that sealed the defendant’s fair use defense.
The court recognized that the defendant sold Hustler Magazine for profit, which 
normally would have militated against fair use.318  However, the court also agreed with 
the magazine’s claim that it published the two postcards with commentary to entertain
rather than to sell magazines.319  That distinction is a fiction because the defendant 
published Hustler Magazine to entertain its readers only in order to sell magazines.  
Similarly, when analyzing the nature of the copyrighted work, the court found that the 
314 626 F. Supp. 201, 212-214 (D. Mass. 1986).  For more analysis of this case, see E. Kenly Ames, Note, 
Beyond Rogers v. Koons: A Fair Use Standard for Appropriation, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1473, 1492-93 
(1993) (discussing the fair use analysis in Haberman); Sara T. Murphy, Comment, Copyright Law—First 
Circuit Countermands Photographer’s Copyright in Favor of Fair Use—Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News 
Corp., 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 689, 692 n.30, 695 n.57, n.58 (2001) (same).
315 See Haberman, 626 F. Supp. at 210-211.
316 Id. at 212.
317
  Id.
318 Id. at 210.  
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photographs deserved heightened protection because they were “creative, imaginative, 
and original”320 and “represent[ed] a substantial investment of time and labor in 
anticipation of a financial return.”321  Nevertheless, the court went on to discount the 
nature of the plaintiff’s copyrighted works because they had been made public in the 
form of postcards—an ironic twist in light of the court’s emphasis on the limited 
dissemination of the images.322 The court appears to have made its decision purely on the 
positive market benefits of the unlicensed use, without giving credence to other factors 
that might have weighed against a fair use finding.323
3. Courts Using a Balancing Test
In the landmark case of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,324 the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled that the extent to which an alleged infringer enhances the potential market for 
a copyrighted work must be measured in terms of degree and then balanced against the 
other three fair use factors.325  In stating that the benefit to a copyright holder’s market is 
only one variable in measuring fair use, the Court described a process of weighing all 
four fair use factors in a “sensitive balancing of interests.”326  The majority stated that 
319 Haberman, 626 F. Supp. at 211.  Further, entertainment is not one of the permissible purposes for fair 
use listed in the Copyright Act.  17 U.S.C. § 107 (2003).  While that list is not all-inclusive, the court offers 
no justification for why copying intended to entertain, absent anything else, is not exploitative.





  This is similar to the reasoning employed in Amsinck v. Colum. Pictures Indus., where the court, in 
dicta, rejected a balancing approach to fair use and advocated a per se rule in cases where there was no 
harm from the unlicensed use and possible benefit to the copyright holder’s market.  862 F. Supp. 1044, 
1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
324
  510 U.S. 569, 590-91 (1994).
325 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590-91.  Courts in other cases made similar analyses.  See, e.g., Lish v. 
Harper’s Mag. Found., 807 F. Supp. 1090, 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding that without harm to the 
copyright holder’s potential market, it is likely that the fair use doctrine would not apply; however, the 
other factors must still be considered); Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 739 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(balancing the four factors weighs in favor of fair use in the case of a biographer’s unauthorized use of 
private letters). 
326 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 
n.40 (1984)).         
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“[m]arket harm is a matter of degree, and the importance of this factor will vary, not only 
with the amount of harm, but also with the relative strength of the showing on the other 
factors.”327 Lower courts have adopted the Campbell balancing test in this way.
a. Public Use
In a recent decision, Bond v. Blum,328 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit applied the Campbell balancing test to the defendants’ fair use claim made in 
response to charges that copying a manuscript for use in a child custody case violated the 
plaintiff’s copyright in the manuscript. Mr. Slavin and the law firm representing him 
introduced into evidence a book written by his former wife’s current husband entitled 
Self- Portrait of a Patricide: How I Got Away with Murder.  The court found defendants’ 
use fair.329  While recognizing that defendants’ verbatim copying of the entire 
manuscript militated against fair use under the third factor,330 the court emphasized that 
the defendants introduced the manuscript for its evidentiary value and not for its mode of 
expression.331  As to the market effect of the unlicensed use, the court, quoting the district 
court, stated, "Ironically, if anything, [the defendants' use] increases the value of the work 
in a perverse way, but it certainly doesn't decrease it."332 In balancing the four factors, 
the court relied heavily on the public nature of the unauthorized use, noting that “the 
public has an interest in retaining in the public domain ‘the right to discover facts’”—
especially those facts constituting evidence in a judicial proceeding.333
b. Private Motivation
327
  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591. 
328
  317 F.3d 385, 392 (4th Cir. 2003).
329 Id.
330 Id. at 395.
331 Id. 
332 Id. at 396-7 (citations omitted).
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 In Jackson v. Warner Bros. Inc.,334 the producers of Made in America used 
artwork by an African-American artist as part of the set for their movie without obtaining 
the artist’s permission.  The plaintiff thought that the movie’s depiction of African-
Americans was “culturally exploitative” and sued for copyright infringement.335 The 
court found the defendant’s use fair after balancing all four fair use factors and finding 
that only the second factor favored the plaintiff.336  The Michigan federal district court
quoted Campbell in response to the defendant’s evidence that its use increased the sale of 
the plaintiff’s artwork—“that favorable evidence without more is no guarantee of 
fairness.”337 But interestingly, after noting that the defendant did not meet its burden 
under Campbell to show absence of market harm, the court went on to find that Campbell
was distinguishable.338   According to the district court, in Campbell, there was evidence 
of substantial harm to a derivative market, and harm to the original market (as in 
Jackson) was not at issue.339  The court then gave substantial weight to the fourth factor 
and concluded that there was no showing that the defendant’s use harmed the market for 
the copyright holder’s art and that the factor therefore favored the defendant. 340
333 Id. at 394 (quoting Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 74 F.3d 488, 492 (4th 
Cir. 1996)).   
334
  993 F. Supp. 585, 591-592 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
335 Id. at 587.
336 Id. at 585.
337 Id. at 591.
338 Id.
339 Id.
340 Id. The court relied on the four factors as set out by the court in Amsinck v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 
Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1044, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).  In that case, the court considered, “1) whether the use 
tends to interfere with sales of the copyrighted article; 2) whether the challenged use adversely affects the 
potential market for the copyrighted work; 3) whether the ‘copying’ can be used as a substitute for 
plaintiff's original work; and, 4) whether the copyright owner suffers demonstrable harm.”  Id.  In Amsinck, 
the plaintiff’s work, a mobile, appeared in the defendant’s film for a total of one minute and thirty-six 
seconds.  Id. at 1045-46.  The court described the fourth factor as “whether the use tends to interfere with 
sales of the copyrighted article. … While the mere absence of measurable pecuniary damages does not 
require a finding of fair use, the less adverse the effect that the alleged infringing has on a copyright 
owner’s expectations of financial gain, the less public benefit need be shown to justify the use.” Id. at 1048-
49.
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Similarly, in Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., the court balanced the 
fair use factors to conclude that despite defendants’ purely private use of an 
advertisement parody for fundraising purposes, the unauthorized use was fair.341  In 1983, 
Hustler Magazine published an ad parody featuring Reverend Jerry Falwell.  Soon after
publication, Falwell included copies of the ad parody in his fundraising literature and 
commercials. Hustler Magazine  sued Falwell and his religious organizations for 
copyright infringement and the defendants claimed fair use.342 The court found that 
despite the defendants’ commercial use of the parody, it was “consistent with 
congressional intent to find that Falwell was entitled to provide his followers with copies 
of the parody in order effectively to give his views of the derogatory statements it 
contained.”343 The fourth factor also favored the defendants, with the court noting, “In 
fact Hustler republished the same parody in its March, 1984 issue, indicating that if 
anything plaintiff thought the market for the parody had increased.”344
***
The attempt to categorize the cases discussed in this section reveals some 
common trends, but perhaps does more to reveal inconsistencies in how courts approach 
the fair use doctrine.   From these commonalities and differences emerges a framework 
for evaluating fair use in cases in which the unlicensed use possibly benefits the 
copyright holder’s market.
V. A FAIR USE FRAMEWORK AND THE FOURTH FACTOR
The gaps in U.S. copyright law are increasing in step with changes in technology 
341 Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 1526, 1539-1540 (C.D. Cal. 1985)
342 Id. at 1529.
343 Id. at 1535.
344 Id. at 1540.
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(e.g., innovative media, enhanced means of duplicating copyrighted works, and new 
avenues of expression), which are giving rise to unpredictable conflicts between private 
property rights and the public interest.345  Despite the most recent call by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Campbell to balance all four fair use factors,346 courts continue to 
emphasize the fourth factor most heavily—the market effects (and, most often, the 
market harm) from the unlicensed use of copyrighted works.347  In cases where an 
unlicensed use benefits or has no effect on the copyright holder’s potential market, 
striking a balance between the private economic rights of creators and the public’s access 
to creative works is easiest.  In such cases, courts should protect transformative or public 
uses as fair, and not necessarily protect uses that are both non-transformative and private.  
However, in the latter scenario, the copyright holder, if successful in litigation, should be 
limited to injunctive relief, or where injunctive relief would prove ineffective, statutory or 
other monetary damages should be offset by the benefit to the copyright holder’s market. 
This framework demands that courts account for a copyright holder’s lost 
licensing royalties in its analysis of market effect only if a primary or derivative market 
345 See, e.g., Kul, supra note 126, at 264 (“Digital technology therefore has ‘the potential to demolish a 
careful balancing of public good and private interest that has emerged from the evolution of U.S. 
intellectual property law over the past 200 years.’”) (quoting COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS AND THE EMERGING INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE 
DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 2 (National Academy 2000)).
346 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994) (“Nor may the four statutory factors be 
treated in isolation, one from another. All are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of 
the purposes of copyright.”).
347 See, e.g., Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 396 (4th Cir. 2003) (“This factor is ‘undoubtedly the single most 
important element of fair use.’”) (quoting Harper & Row, Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 
(1985)); Sony Computer Ent. v. Bleem, 214 F.3d 1022, 1029 (9th Cir. 2000) (“In addressing this fourth and 
most important factor, the Supreme Court considered…”); Sundeman v. Seajay Socy., 142 F.3d 194, 206-
07 (4th Cir. 1998) (“This fourth factor ‘is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.’”) 
(quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566); Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Serv., Inc., 99 
F.3d 1381, 1386 (6th Cir. 1996) (“In determining whether a use is ‘fair,’ the Supreme Court has said that the 
most important factor is the fourth … We take it that this factor … is at least primus inter pares, 
figuratively speaking, and we shall turn to it first.”); Lowry’s Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 2003 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 11826, *24 (D. Md. 2003) (“This factor is ‘undoubtedly the single most important element of 
fair use.’”) (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566).
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for licensing the original work exists, and only if the copyright holder is willing and able 
to exploit that market.  Where such markets do not exist, licensing royalties are not part 
of the copyright holder’s expectation interest348 in the copyright, so courts should not 
factor in unrealized royalties into their analysis of the copyright holder’s market.349  To 
do so does nothing further to protect the incentives of artists and authors to create new 
works. 
A. Removing the Emphasis on Licensing Rationales
Many courts reject fair use claims to protect the right of copyright holders to 
choose between the benefits of an expanded market and the opportunity to realize 
royalties by licensing their original works to other users.350  This approach has two 
348
  An “expectation interest” is a traditional contract law concept used in calculating damages for breach of 
contract.  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a) (1982); E. Allen Farnsworth, 
Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 
1339, 1341 (1985) (“[I]t is a principle of the law of contracts that damages for breach should be based on 
the injured party’s lost expectation.”) (citing U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1978)); Robert Cooter & Melvin 
Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1432, 1434 (1985) (“The conventional 
analysis of contracts holds that the purpose of damages is to compensate the victim of breach for his injury.  
This purpose, in turn, is normally to be accomplished by awarding expectation damages—that is, the 
amount required to put the injured party where he would have been if the contract had been performed.  
The goal, compensation, and the means, expectation damages, are so ingrained in contract law as to seem 
self-evident.”); Steven J. Burton & Eric G. Anderson, The World of a Contract, 75 IOWA L. REV. 861, 865 
(1990) (“The expectation interest defines the harm that is the distinctive (though not the sole) concern of 
contract law.  Compensation for harm to the expectation interest is well recognized as the prime goal of the 
main judicial remedies for breach of contract.”).  The Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines the 
“expectation interest” as the promisee’s “interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as 
good a position as he would have been had the contract been performed.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 344(a) (1982).  In determining the position of the plaintiff but for the breach (or in the case 
of copyright, the infringement), the law has required that the expectation interest be forseeable and shown 
with sufficient certainty.  See id. at cmt. b, §§ 351, 352.  Similarly, the forseeability and certainty 
requirement for measuring expectancy interests would most likely bar recovery for lost licensing revenues 
in a previously nonexistent licensing market.
349
  A copyright holder’s expectation in a copyright is the economic value of the copyright to the creator at 
the time the original work is created.  Current copyright law, in different ways, enables copyright holders to 
receive more than their expectation interest upon infringement.  For example, the law entitles copyright 
holders to an infringer’s profits (disgorgement) from an unlicensed use, see supra note 42, even though the 
copyright holder did not expect infringement at the time of creation.  Likewise, licensing revenues that the 
copyright holder never intended to realize are outside of the copyright holder’s expectation.  As discussed 
in Part V-C and Part VI, infra, perhaps using an expectancy measure for calculating damages in copyright 
infringement cases is most consistent with the predominant utilitarian theory of intellectual property and 
best balances private economic rights and the public interest.
350 See, e.g., Part IV-A and Part IV-B, supra.
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potential pitfalls.  First, these courts often assume copyright holders and unlicensed users 
(and copyright holders and other users) can enter into licensing agreements with minimal
transaction costs. If transaction costs are too high, or, as is often the case, the copyright 
holder is simply unwilling to license an original work or no market exists for such a 
license,  then courts should not protect the copyright holder’s right to license because the 
copyright holder has no expectation of realizing licensing revenues.  Therefore, any 
judicial fair use inquiry should start with a determination as to whether a market for 
licensing the original work exists. 
Second, through their focus on potential licensing revenues, courts are doing more 
than simply preserving the rights of copyright holders to control the dissemination of 
their works. Even where a market for licensing original works existed, copyright holders 
reap the market benefit of an unlicensed use and—under a statutory or compensatory 
measure of damages—receive damages for that use.  To more accurately preserve the 
rights of copyright holders to license their works and to not give artists and authors an 
over-incentive to create, courts should offset the value of any market benefit to the 
copyright holder against whatever monetary damages would otherwise have been
awarded.
Several cases reflect these pitfalls inherent in trying to protect the rights of 
copyright holders to license their works to unlicensed users.  For example, in DC Comics, 
Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc.,351 the appellate court did not find the comic book store’s 
appropriation of the plaintiff’s copyrights fair as a matter of law because the defendant 
precluded DC Comics from licensing the Batman name and symbols to the comic book 
store. But the court failed to define the factual issues for the lower court to consider on 
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remand—most notably, whether the copyright holder would have licensed its copyrights 
to the comic book store absent litigation and whether it could have done so without high 
transaction costs.  If a license were improbable, the court should have directed the trial
court not to factor lost licensing royalties into its market analysis upon remand.
In Iowa State U. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcast Co., Inc., 352 the 
court looked more closely at the plaintiff’s ability and willingness to license its videotape 
of an Olympic wrestler to the defendant and made an apparent assumption (which was 
never proven) that the plaintiff could have and would have licensed the copyrighted 
videotape to the defendant absent infringement and litigation.   If the court was correct in 
its assumption, then it decided the fair use inquiry correctly because the plaintiff’s 
licensing royalties would most likely have exceeded any other market benefit to the 
copyright holder from the unlicensed use (especially because the defendant had a 
monopoly on the Olympic Games coverage).  However, the monetary value of any
proven market benefit to the copyright holder should have been subtracted from the 
plaintiff’s damages, an omission that defeated the court’s purpose in preserving the 
copyright holder’s choice between attempting to exploit the market for licensing its 
videotape on the one hand, and withholding consent for any such license and reaping the 
benefits of an enhanced market on the other.353
In Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of Month Club, 354 the court found defendant’s 
351
  696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982).
352 621 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1980).
353 See id. If Iowa State had granted ABC a non-exclusive license to use the videotape, then Iowa State 
could theoretically have received licensing royalties from ABC and reaped the benefits of an enhanced 
market.  However, such a result was implausible as ABC did not even seek Iowa State’s permission to use 
the videotape.  Additionally, if the parties had negotiated a licensing agreement, the parties would have 
negotiated a royalty rate that accounted for the possibility of market benefit (as an economic benefit to the 
transaction), something that courts seem unwilling to account for in awarding damages.
354 13 F. Supp.2d 782 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
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shareware versions of the plaintiff’s copyrighted software unfair because to find 
otherwise, would have required the court to impose a compulsory license on the 
copyright holder. The court in this case found the question irrelevant of whether a market 
existed for a license between the plaintiff and the defendant.  Regardless of the net effect 
of the unlicensed use on the plaintiff’s potential market, the court paradoxically 
suggested that copyright holders should have their licensing rights protected even when 
no such license is possible.355  Such protection seems unrelated to protecting artists’ and 
authors’ incentives to create because a copyright holder does not expect to reap market 
benefits and realize licensing royalties when no market for a license exists.
Decisions protecting copyright holders’ rights to license works to users other than 
alleged infringers raise the same issue as to whether a plausible market for licensing 
exists.  In Rubin v. Brooks/Cole Publg. Co.,356  the court rejected the defendant’s fair use 
claim because the defendant-publisher’s unlicensed use might have affected the 
plaintiff’s ability to license the “Love Scale” to other textbook publishers in the future.  In 
reaching that conclusion, the court’s fourth factor analysis was skewed.  While noting the 
absence of evidence that the defendant harmed the plaintiff’s potential market and 
speculating that the unlicensed use might have increased demand for the copyrighted 
“Love Scale” in question, the court nevertheless ruled in favor of the plaintiff.357  The 
decision overlooked two critical facts that made the existence of such a market for 
licensing implausible: a) other textbook authors had used the same copyrighted work 
355 See id. at 790-91.  But see American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929-30 (2d Cir. 
1994) (“However, not every effect on potential licensing revenues enters the analysis under the fourth 
factor. Specifically, courts have recognized limits on the concept of “potential licensing revenues” by 
considering only traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed markets when examining and assessing a 
secondary use’s ‘effect upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.’”). 
356 836 F. Supp. 909, 920-22 (D. Mass. 1993).
357 Id. at 922.
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without paying royalties, including many who had received prior permission  to do so; and 
b) the plaintiff offered no proof that a market for licensing the “Love Scale” to other 
users existed.358  The court was able to avoid drawing any conclusions about the net 
effect of the unlicensed use on the copyright holder’s potential market by making an 
unprincipled decision that reflected the compromise in its analysis—the court entered an 
injunction to enjoin future use by the defendant but did not award the plaintiff damages 
for the defendant’s past use of the “Love Scale.”359
In Castle Rock Ent., Inc. v. Carol Publg. Group, Inc., 360 a decision resembling the 
dicta in Storm Impact, Inc., the court found the dissemination of the defendant’s Seinfeld 
trivia book unfair, holding that Castle Rock (the producer of the Seinfeld television 
program) had exclusive rights to derivative works regardless of whether it intended to 
enter the markets for those works. In this case, the plaintiff could not demonstrate any 
harm to its potential derivative markets because it had no desire to exploit those 
markets.361 Even though the court recognized that the defendant’s use was 
transformative, it ruled that the degree of transformation was not enough to support a fair 
use finding.362  However, in light of the fact that the only possible effect of the use on the 
plaintiff’s market was beneficial, even a slight degree of transformation should have been 
enough to support a finding of fair use.
Likewise, in Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications Intl., Ltd.,363  the copyright 
holder had once showed an interest in exploiting derivative markets, yet admitted that its 
358 See id. (“In spite of these shortcomings, however, the Court is inclined to infer that at least some market 
exists for licensing the Love Scale to other textbook authors.”).
359 Id.
360
  50 F.3d 132, 145-46 (2d Cir. 1998).
361 Id.
362 Id. at 143.
363
  996 F.2d 1366 (2nd Cir. 1993).
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interest in those markets decreased as the popularity of Twin Peaks diminished. 364    The 
court gave greater weight to the plaintiff’s passive interests in market development than
to the economic benefit from the defendant’s unlicensed use, and did not consider 
whether a market for licensing the original work for derivative uses existed.365  Whether 
correct, the court, as in other cases, made no suggestion that the value of the benefit to the 
plaintiff’s market should have been subtracted from any damages that otherwise would 
have been awarded to the plaintiff. 366  The court ignored the economic realities of the 
copyright holder’s market as is characteristic of courts in fair use cases.
B. Two-Part Framework
Eliminating reliance on the copyright holder’s lost licensing royalties when no 
market for such licensing exists is the necessary first step to assessing any net market 
benefit from an unlicensed use.   Only when a market for such licensing exists, and the 
copyright holder is able and willing to exploit that market, should lost licensing royalties 
be considered in measuring the effects of the unlicensed use on the copyright holder’s 
market.  
With the licensing obstacle aside, courts should apply a relatively simple rubric in 
fair use cases where there exists a possible benefit (or, at minimum, there is no market 
harm) to the copyright holder’s market from the unlicensed use.  In such cases,
transformative and other public uses would be fair, while non-transformative and non-
private uses would be presumptively unfair, but damages in the latter scenario would be 
364 Id. at 1377.
365 Id.
366 See id.  See also Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publg. Group, Inc., 11 F. Supp. 329, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 
1998).
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limited when the copyright holder is successful in litigation.367
While this approach rejects the importance that some courts place on the 
commercial/non-commercial dichotomy,368 that dichotomy is not very effective in 
helping to draw the line between fair and unfair uses.369  As courts have defined the 
inquiry, the question is not whether the unlicensed use is part of a commercial work, but 
whether the unlicensed user has exploited the original work for commercial gain.370  Such 
inquiry is often a fiction because almost any unlicensed use in a commercial work is, in 
part, for commercial gain even if there are other purposes for the use as well.371 The 
murkiness of the test gives courts great latitude in categorizing uses as either commercial
or non-commercial in fair use cases.
The grant of exclusive rights to creators and the statutory limitations on those 
rights were both enacted for the benefit of the public.372  The dichotomy between 
commercial and non-commercial uses avoids the question of whether an unlicensed use is 
consistent with the public purpose of U.S. copyright law.  Transformative uses, even if 
undertaken for commercial purposes, add new works to the public domain.373
367
  One of the primary objections to this framework is the speculative nature of measuring market benefit 
or finding the absence of any market harm.  However, evaluating market harm under the fourth fair use 
factor and calculating copyright damages are equally as subjective and speculative.  The fourth factor is a 
difficult criterion for measuring justice, yet it is a crucial guideline for determining fair use in a justice 
system based on economic rather than moral rights.   
368 See supra notes 84-87, 121, 123 and accompanying text.
369 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
370 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
371 See, e.g., Haberman v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 626 F. Supp. 201, 212-214 (D. Mass. 1986); see also supra
notes 318-321 and accompanying text.
372 See, e.g., U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (“the limited grant is a 
means by which an important public purpose may be achieved.  It is intended to motivate the creative 
activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward.”).  Determining fair use “involves a 
difficult balance between the interests of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their 
writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society’s competing interest in the free flow of ideas, 
information, and commerce on the other hand.” Id.
373
  An obvious example would be a critical book review printed in a newspaper or magazine.
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Conversely, some non-commercial uses, such as the videotaping of television programs
for personal use, do not fulfill any public purpose.374  Therefore, with a commercial/non-
commercial dichotomy, even after an unlicensed use is categorized, the critical inquiry of 
whether the use is in furtherance of a public purpose remains.
Therefore, a more useful dichotomy is between public and private uses, a 
distinction helpful in analyzing whether unlicensed uses are consistent with the public 
purpose of copyright law.  Public uses include transformative uses (which further the 
objective of U.S. copyright law to add new works to the public domain), but also include 
non-transformative uses satisfying other governmental objectives such as education and 
public adjudication.  The use of copyrighted games in an educational children’s gaming 
tournament (Allen v. Academic Games) and the introduction of a copyrighted manuscript 
into evidence at a custody hearing (Bond v. Blum) are both public uses.
Private uses do not fulfill a governmental purpose.375  Private uses may include 
copying for the purposes of advertising, such as calling one’s comic book store “The 
Batcave,” (DC Comics v. Reel Fantasy) or a religious organization’s use of an 
advertisement parody in fundraising literature (Hustler Magazine. v. Moral Majority), 
374
  See, e.g., Melville B. Nimmer, Copyright Liability for Audio Home Recording: Dispelling the Betamax 
Myth, 68 VA. L. REV. 1505, 1521-22 (1982) (“The Betamax court of appeals properly found that fair use is 
not applicable where the user copies a protected work merely for his own ‘convenience’ or ‘entertainment.’   
Yet it is an ‘entertainment’ use, and only that, which is involved in most audio home recording.  It cannot 
be said that the purpose and character of home recording meets the first requirement of fair use.”).
375
  Private uses include those similar to what Justice Blackmun described as “purely personal 
consumption” in Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 495 (1984) (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting).  Justice  Blackmun explained that “[i]t is clear, however, that personal use of programs that 
have been copied without permission is not what 107(1) protects. The intent of the section is to encourage 
users to engage in activities the primary benefit of which accrues to others. Time-shifting involves no such 
humanitarian impulse. … Purely consumptive uses are certainly not what the fair use doctrine was designed 
to protect, and the awkwardness of applying the statutory language to time-shifting only makes clearer that 
fair use was designed to protect only uses that are productive.”  Id. at 496.
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uses that, on their face, do not further any public purpose.376  Yet another possible private 
use is downloading (essentially copying a copy) an MP3 music file for one’s own 
personal music collection. This public/private use dichotomy is instructive to the two-
part framework discussed below. 
1. Market enhancement + transformative or public use = fair use
Judicial guidelines require a clear understanding of the purpose of copyright law.  
One motivation for granting copyright protection is to preserve an artist’s or author’s 
incentive to create; the counterbalance is the desire to augment the public domain.  When 
there is a possible net benefit (or, at minimum, an absence of any harm) to the copyright 
holder’s market from an unlicensed use, a finding of fair use protects the economic 
expectancies of copyright holders without undermining the incentive to create.
Likewise, where the unlicensed use is transformative or public, the user has added to the 
quality and quantity of original works available to the public or fulfilled some other 
public purpose.  In a legal system adverse to moral rights, a finding of fair use under 
these circumstances strikes the balance that many theorists and judges seek between 
private property rights and the public interest.  The competing goals—the copyright 
holder’s expectations of protection for resource investment and financial reward as well 
as the public’s interest in having access to an ever-increasing number of creative works—
are both fulfilled when transformative or public uses that do not harm the copyright 
holder’s market are found to be fair.377
376
  While advertising and fundraising can indirectly make an original work accessible to more people, the 
connection is weak because in most cases, the public would already have had access to the original work 
before the advertising or fundraising occurred.
377 See, e.g., Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2003); Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 
18 (1st Cir. 2000); Allen v. Academic Games League of Am., Inc, 89 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 1996); Hofheinz v. 
AMC Prod., Inc. 147 F. Supp. 2d 127 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
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2. Market Enhancement + non-transformative and private use = if no fair use, then 
limitations on damages
In cases where there is a net benefit (or an absence of any harm) to the copyright 
holder’s market from a non-transformative and private use, a finding of fair use is 
consistent with protecting the copyright holder’s expectancy and the incentive to create.   
But in these cases, there is no strong countervailing public interest furthered by the 
unlicensed use.378  Consequently, a finding of fair use is not necessary to balance the 
economic rights of the copyright holder and the public interest, and most of what is at 
stake are competing private interests.    Consequently, courts should presume that such 
unlicensed uses are unfair, and in most, if not all, cases, find that the private motives of 
the unlicensed user do not provide a sufficient justification for fair use.
However, at the same time, the law should not provide copyright holders 
economic rewards (in the form of damages) beyond their expectation interests. Many
courts have allowed copyright holders to collect damages and reap the benefits of an 
enhanced market379—a double-reward process that exceeds the incentives that copyright 
law was designed to protect.  In these cases, because the copyright holder is benefiting 
economically or, at minimum, suffering no harm, there must be some moral or social 
objection to the unlicensed use. Without a moral or social objection, there would be no 
litigation, as is the case with the comic book market in Japan.   Therefore, the preferred 
remedy in cases of non-economic harm to copyright holders should be an injunction380
but only if injunctory relief prevents the unlicensed use.  In cases where injunctions 
would be futile (e.g., to prevent the publication of pre-release excerpts of J. K. Rowling’s 
378 See, e.g., DC Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982).
379 See generally Part IV-A, supra.
380
 A court would also have to award the copyright holder attorneys’ fees and costs to protect fully the 
copyright holder’s expectancy in the copyright.
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latest book), the value of any benefit to the copyright holder’s market should offset 
statutory or other compensatory damage awards.381 The copyright holder should not reap 
damages from infringement as well as the benefits of infringement at the same time.
In certain other situations, U.S. copyright law allows for multiple recoveries—for 
instance, the copyright holder who recovers lost profits plus the unlicensed user’s profits 
(disgorgement), or the copyright holder who receives treble damages in certain cases of 
willful infringement.382  “Double recovery” in copyright cases has come under 
considerable scrutiny.383  Most critics have focused on the potential for the copyright 
holder’s monetary recovery to exceed the actual damages from the unlicensed use, 
especially in cases where courts seek to disgorge the profits of the unlicensed user 
attributable to the infringement.384   A model of awarding economic damages equal to the 
copyright holder’s expectation interest, in cases of market benefit and in infringement 
cases more generally, precludes the need for courts to make subjective, fact-specific 
inquiries into an unlicensed user’s motives, and prevents an unnecessary chilling effect 
381
  In cases where there is no economic harm to the copyright holder’s market from the unlicensed use, and 
the copyright holder prevails, the copyright holder’s economic expectancy can be realized by an award of 
attorneys’ fees and costs alone.  But copyright holders also have an expectancy, although non-economic, in 
protection from certain unlicensed uses, and awards of statutory damages (to the extent that those damages 
exceed the value of any market benefit) might be necessary to deter private, unlicensed uses of original 
works.
382 See supra note 42 (discussing methods of calculating damages for copyright infringement under the 
Copyright Act); see also 17 U.S.C. § 504(d) (2003).
383 See, e.g., Andrew W. Coleman, Copyright Damages and the Value of the Infringing Use: Restitutionary 
Recovery in Copyright Infringement Actions, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 91, 92-93 (1993) (“[A] copyright owner is 
entitled to recover both actual damages and any profits of the infringer. … ‘Damages are awarded to 
compensate the copyright owner for losses from the infringement, and profits are awarded to prevent the 
infringer from unfairly benefiting from a wrongful act.’”) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 66 (1976);  Dane S. Ciolino, Reconsidering Restitution in Copyright, 48 EMORY L.J. 1, 32-33 (1999) 
(“[T]he Copyright Act potentially permits owners to recover amounts far in excess of their actual losses.  
Take for example a songwriter whose copyright in a previously-distributed musical work has been 
infringed, albeit innocently, by a recording artist.  Although the songwriter may have suffered only the loss 
of a statutory royalty, he nonetheless may recover all profits of the recording artist attributable to the 
musical work—without regard to the fact that such profits may far exceed the amount that the songwriter 
would have received had the infringer obtained a license ex ante.”).
384 Id.
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on those who seek to transform or use original works legally but do not do so out of fear 
of the restitutionary or punitive nature of copyright damages.  As copyright law is a 
difficult balancing act, invoking restitution or punishment adds another equitable variable 
into fair use inquiries and leaves little room for error.
C. Aligning the Framework with Intellectual Property Theories
The framework just described is arguably most consistent with utilitarianism, the 
predominant theory of intellectual property.385  The current U.S. copyright system rests 
on primarily utilitarian principles, and the proposed framework fulfills utilitarian 
objectives in protecting the economic incentives of creators, recognizing the economic 
realities of licensing, encouraging the use of copyrighted works that are transformative or 
otherwise public in nature, and reducing the undesired chilling effect of copyright law on 
potential users.  Increasing the utilization and production of copyrighted works would 
maximize the net social welfare; the greatest number of people would benefit by 
expanding the number of permissible uses while still protecting the copyright holder’s 
incentive to create.  Creators need to maintain a clear understanding of what to expect 
from the legal system (protection of their incentives and investments) as well as what 
they must give up to users (permission to transform copyrighted works or otherwise use 
them for the public good), and the framework provides such an understanding.  
The tenets of labor theory are facially inconsistent with the concept of balancing 
in intellectual property cases.386  Still, in cases where public or transformative uses 
benefit (or do no harm) to the copyright holder’s market, findings of fair use would 
enable copyright holders to recoup investment costs, while, at least in the case of 
385 See generally Part III-A, supra.
386
 See generally Part III-B, supra.
83
transformative uses, add new creative works to the public domain.
 While personality theory emphasizes personal expression and moral rights rather 
than economic rights,387 the proposed framework, in part, is reconcilable with personality 
theory because it discourages private unlicensed uses that a copyright holder finds
morally or socially offensive.  However, the challenge in reconciling personality theory 
with the proposed framework lies in how to resolve the conflict between a creator’s moral 
rights and the interest of the public in accessing a broader domain of creative works.388
Social planning theory, with its view toward developing a more just society,389
shares the emphasis of the proposed framework on protecting and encouraging 
transformative and other public uses in cases where the unlicensed use poses no 
economic harm to the copyright holder. Some of the proposals of social planning 
theorists, such as to shorten the length of the copyright term, to curtail protection of 
derivative uses, and to impose a compulsory licensing scheme on copyright holders might
offer even greater protection of the public interest.  However, such theorists do not offer 
any more direction than current utilitarian theorists as to where to draw the line between 
fair and unfair uses.
Regardless of which intellectual property theory or theories courts invoke in 
specific cases, they universally try to balance the private rights of the copyright holder
and the public interest in their fair use jurisprudence.  The proposed framework directly 
addresses this central principle of copyright law in cases where an unlicensed use 
possibly benefits (and, at minimum, does not harm) a copyright holder’s market. 
387
 See generally Part III-C, supra.
388
 As the proposed framework assumes the acceptance of the current economic-based copyright system, 
such reconciliation is beyond the scope of this article.
389
  See generally Part III-D, supra.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The difficulty in applying the fair use doctrine, especially the fourth factor, is 
largely attributable to a lack of consensus in defining the fundamental goals and 
principles of intellectual property law.  How courts should factor market benefit (or an 
absence of market harm) into the fair use equation crystallizes the tension in copyright 
law between private property rights and the public domain.
This tension spills over into other areas of intellectual property law as well.  For 
example, how strictly or liberally a court should interpret the doctrine of equivalents is a 
question about where to draw the line between the private economic rights of inventors 
and public access to technology.390  Similarly, the multi-factor “likelihood of confusion”
test for trademark infringement, similar to the four-factor fair use inquiry, is a difficult, 
fact-specific inquiry that is much less about confusion and more about the extent to which 
the U.S. trademark laws protect private economic interests in names and marks versus 
making those same names and marks available to the public.391
A consequence of this tension in intellectual property law has been a trend over 
the last few decades toward expanding the protections afforded to the holders of 
copyrights, patents, and trademarks.392 However, a grant of a copyright or other 
390
  See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730-31 (2002) 
(upholding the doctrine of equivalents) (“The patent laws ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts’ 
by rewarding innovation with a temporary monopoly. The monopoly is a property right; and like any 
property right, its boundaries should be clear. This clarity is essential to promote progress, because it 
enables efficient investment in innovation. A patent holder should know what he owns, and the public 
should know what he does not.”).
391
  See William W. Fisher, III, The Growth of Intellectual Property: A History of the Ownership of Ideas in 
the United States, 7-8 (1999), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iphistory.pdf.
392 Id. at 10-12.  Part of this can be attributed to the fact that intellectual property rights have taken on  
more of the characteristics of property rights.  Professor Fisher explains, “Gradually over the course of 
American history, this discourse [focusing on limited monopolies] was supplanted by one centered on the 
notion that rights to control the use and dissemination of information are forms of ‘property.’” Id. at 20.  
Traditionally property rights are more absolute than contract rights and come with a broader set of 
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intellectual property is, in fact, an exchange of rights—the private inventor or creator or 
business receives certain rights in exchange for giving the public certain access to that 
creativity and inventorship. This perception is more consistent with contract law than 
property law—i.e. intellectual property holders have an expectancy of certain economic 
protections in exchange for allowing public use of their creations under certain 
circumstances.  Courts already use many common law contract terms such as “good 
faith” and “fair dealing” in trying to strike a balance between private economic rights and 
the public interest in intellectual property law.393
Such a paradigmatic shift in thinking about intellectual property rights is probably 
a long time away (and beyond the scope of this article).  But even if the smaller-scale 
framework advanced in Part V is applied to J. K. Rowling’s suit against the New York
Daily News,394 we should conclude that the New York Daily News’ publication of 
excerpts from Harry Potter and the Order of the Phoenix does not constitute fair use 
because the use was private and non-transformative.  However, the framework also 
acknowledges a neutral or positive market effect to the author’s market.  A fair 
resolution, therefore, would award the copyright holder statutory damages for 
infringement but offset those damages against the value of any benefit to the copyright 
holder’s market. But Harry Potter himself cannot read the divination tea leaves and 
remedies.  See generally id. at 20-23.  “There was once a theory that the law of trademarks and tradenames 
was an attempt to protect the consumer against the ‘passing off’ of inferior goods under misleading labels.  
Increasingly the courts have departed from any such theory and have come to view this branch of law as a 
protection of property rights in diverse economically valuable sale devices.   In practice, injunctive relief is 
being extended today to realms where no actual danger of confusion to the consumer is present.”  Id. at 22 
(quoting Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 
814-17 (1935)).
393 See Fisher, Theories, supra note 174, at 10 (citing Harper & Row, Publ'rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 
U.S. 539, 563 (1985); Time v. Bernard Geis Associates, 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Rosemont 
Enterprises v. Random House, 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966); Holdridge v. Knight Publishing Corp., 
214 F. Supp. 921, 924 (S.D. Cal. 1963)).
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predict the next stages of the fair use debate.  It is clear thought that we must move from 
incantations of Stupefy—meant to halt forward progress—in favor of Alohomora—a 
charm that opens closed doors.
394 See supra note 1.
